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Abstract
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives
within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay.
Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of
the agents’ risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at
most one. Equilibria are generically unique, Pareto efficient, and ensure agreement
within finite expected time. Agents propose best or second-best alternatives. Agents
accept best alternatives, may reject second-best alternatives with positive probabil-
ity, and reject otherwise. For symmetric recognition probabilities and risk coefficients
below one, agreement is immediate and each agent proposes his best alternative.
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1 Introduction
Decisions on collective choice problems are often taken by means of majority voting, and
the analysis of such voting is therefore an important topic in political economy. When
an alternative exists that beats every other feasible alternative in a pairwise vote, i.e. a
Condorcet winner, then this will be the outcome reached for a huge variety of games that
capture the underlying institution. Unfortunately, Condorcet winners may not exist and
this gives rise to the Condorcet paradox in which any alternative can be reached from
any other by a sequence of alternatives, where each alternative in the sequence beats the
previous one by a pairwise majority vote.1 In its most simple form this paradox features
three agents, three alternatives and agents’ preferences such that a pairwise vote over the
alternatives results in a Condorcet cycle: one pair of agents prefers the second alternative
to the third alternative, another pair of agents prefers the first alternative to the second
alternative, and a third pair of agents prefers the third alternative to the first alternative.
Whether and how agents reach an agreement in this paradox cannot be answered. It is
however the main research question of this paper after adding some additional structure
to this voting situation.
We take the strategic bargaining approach to analyze the Condorcet paradox, an ap-
proach that is advocated in Banks and Duggan (2000). Such an approach has several
advantages. It makes explicit how alternatives that are up for voting are selected and
how agents vote on alternatives. The equilibrium strategies specify far-sighted beliefs on
and off the equilibrium path regarding any future continuation. We analyze a version of
Baron-Ferejohn’s (1989) bargaining model with majority voting over proposed alternatives
in which the division of a surplus is replaced by a discrete set of alternatives consisting of
three alternatives. Preferences over these alternatives form a Condorcet cycle and perpet-
ual disagreement is the worst outcome. In every bargaining round, exogenous and positive
recognition probabilities select one agent who has the right to propose. This recognized
agent either proposes one of the three alternatives or gives up the right to propose in
which case bargaining proceeds to the next round. In the former case, the other agents
publicly vote in a sequential order. Majority voting on three alternatives implies that
one vote in favor suffices for acceptance, after which the alternative will be implemented.
Otherwise, no alternative is implemented and we proceed to the next round where random
selection determines the proposer. In order to stay as closely as possible to the literature
on the Condorcet paradox, we refrain from discounting the future or the equivalent of some
exogenous probability of permanent breakdown. Our bargaining model extends the well-
known alternating-offers model of Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987) to three randomly
proposing agents. This model is also closely related to the very general set-up in Banks
and Duggan (2000), though the case with a discrete number of alternatives considered here
is ruled out by their convexity assumption regarding the space of alternatives.
We characterize the set of mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria. A subgame
perfect equilibrium is said to be consistent (CPE) if the strategy of an agent is the same
whenever the agent faces the same continuation game. This notion of consistency corre-
sponds to the “invariance with respect to isomorphisms” of Harsanyi and Selten (1988),
p. 73. This equilibrium notion is in general weaker than the notion of Markov-perfect or
1This literature includes e.g. Plott (1967), Rubinstein (1979), Schofield (1983), Cox (1984), and Le
Breton (1987). The result about sequences of pairwise votes is shown in McKelvey (1976, 1979).
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stationary equilibrium as defined in Maskin and Tirole (2001), but both are closely related
for the class of games under consideration.2 For a foundation of stationary equilibria, we
refer to Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2009).
Our main results give a novel perspective on the indeterminacy of the simplest Con-
dorcet paradox when it is embedded in an institutional setting where a recognized agent
puts up an alternative for majority voting. We discuss our main results pointwise:
Existence. We derive a very simple condition that is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a mixed CPE. To express this condition, we define an agent’s risk coefficient
as the ratio of the utility difference between his best and second-best alternative to the
utility difference between his second-best and his third-best alternative. Risk coefficients
are closely related to the risk limit of Zeuthen (1930) and Harsanyi (1977). The condition
for existence states that the geometric mean of the agents’ risk coefficients should be less
than or equal to one. We define a compromise-prone (or risk averse) agent as someone who
prefers his second-best alternative to the fair lottery over his best and worst alternative.
The subclass with three compromise-prone agents obeys the condition for existence.
Agreement within finite expected time. Every mixed CPE implies a stochastic equilib-
rium outcome that can be seen as a lottery over all three alternatives, each with positive
probability. The probability of perpetual disagreement is zero. Consequently, each agent’s
expected equilibrium utility lies strictly between the utility associated with his worst and
best alternative. We also establish the stronger result that each agent’s expected equilib-
rium utility is at most the utility level of the second-best alternative for sure. The main
message is that, in the presence of Condorcet cycles, agents reach an agreement within
finite expected time.
Pareto efficiency. Even though CPE may involve stochastic delay, such delay is costless.
Since the equilibrium outcome is a lottery over the three alternatives, it follows that every
CPE is Pareto efficient.
Four main cases. The equilibrium analysis distinguishes eight cases, of which seven
can actually occur. Of these cases, three are degenerate and four have positive Lebesgue
measure. In these last four cases, recognized agents apply a possibly degenerate lottery
over their best and second-best alternative, never propose their worst alternative, and
never give up the right to propose. Voters always accept for sure their best alternative,
apply a possibly degenerate lottery in accepting their second-best alternative, and reject
for sure their worst alternative. At most one agent proposes his second-best alternative
with positive probability.
Generic uniqueness. The four main cases each admit unique CPE utilities. The three
degenerate cases may admit multiple CPE utilities. Since the seven cases do not over-
lap, except possibly at their boundaries, the expected CPE utility is generically unique.
For each of the four main cases, the unique CPE utilities are supported by unique CPE
strategies, except for degenerate subcases.
Immediate agreement on the recognized agent’s best alternative in one of the main cases.
In one of the main cases each agent proposes for sure his best alternative, and each agent
accepts for sure both his best and second-best alternatives and rejects for sure his worst
alternative. Such strategies imply immediate agreement. For the symmetric recognition
2Since for convenience Maskin and Tirole (2001) restrict attention to games in which the timing of
moves is independent of previous actions (p. 195), strictly speaking the notion of Markov perfect or
stationary equilibrium is not defined for our bargaining model.
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procedure, the necessary and sufficient condition for immediate agreement is that all three
agents are compromise-prone. In general, for every constellation of utilities, there exists at
least one recognition procedure with immediate agreement.
No limits on stochastic delay. In the three other main cases, there is a positive probabil-
ity that delay occurs. Expected delay can go to infinity when the recognition probability
vector converges to a unit vector, i.e. in the limit one of the agents becomes the only
recognized agent as in a bargaining model with one-sided offers.
Stochastic cycles. Infinite cycles occur according to the logic of the Condorcet paradox.
However, within a cooperative game theoretic setting, Chwe (1994) argues that cycles
cannot occur when agents are farsighted. We study CPE cycles in the sense of whether there
is a positive probability that an equilibrium path can result in which all three alternatives
have been proposed and rejected before some alternative is accepted. Such CPE cycles can
occur, but only in some of the three degenerate cases.
Risk aversion improves the bargaining position. The general conclusion of the bargain-
ing literature is that risk-aversion undermines an agent’s bargaining position in two-agent
bargaining models, see e.g. Roth (1985), Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha (1990), and Kihlstrom,
Roth, and Schmeidler (1991). We investigate changes in risk aversion in our model.
Changes in risk aversion in the main case with immediate agreement do not have any
effect on the probability distribution over alternatives. For the three other main cases, a
less risk-averse agent does worse in the sense that the probability of attaining his best
alternative decreases, and the probabilities of attaining his second-best and worst alterna-
tives both increase. Given Pareto efficiency, at least one agent does strictly better. We
show that the equilibrium utility of one of the three agents is not affected by a change in
risk aversion.
Although CPEs have a simple structure and the simplest Condorcet paradox is con-
sidered, the equilibrium analysis is rather involved because of the astonishing number of
cases that can occur. These cases arise as follows. We first show that application of the
CPE conditions straightforwardly implies several general properties, such as Pareto effi-
ciency, some of the properties of CPE strategies mentioned before, and the fact that an
agent’s expected CPE utility is at most the utility of his second-best alternative. The
latter implies four cases, each case depends upon the number of agents that exactly reach
the utility level of the second-best alternative. We then show that only one of these cases
is impossible, one case has two subcases, and another one even has four subcases. This
makes in total the seven cases mentioned before, of which three are degenerate. For each
case, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence. For each case it is required
that the geometric mean of the agents’ risk coefficients should be at most equal to one.
For each case there are additional conditions related to the recognition probabilities and
the risk coefficients. We show that all additional conditions partition the parameter space
associated with the common condition on the geometric mean, except for some overlap at
common boundaries.
A crucial result in the analysis that helps to reduce the complexity of the problem while
not discarding any essential CPEs is the following: For any CPE and triple of expected CPE
utilities, there also exists a CPE that has the same triple of expected CPE utilities, no one
gives up his right to propose, and in addition agent-independent rejection probabilities. It is
therefore without loss of generality to investigate the latter CPEs. Then, in investigating all
the cases, for each agent there are basically two unknown probabilities associated with the
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lottery by which each agent randomizes over proposing his best and second-best alternative,
and the lottery by which each agent randomizes over accepting or rejecting his second-best
alternative.
An important issue that we treat in a companion paper is the following. Since we
analyze the model without discounting, the bargaining model lacks continuity at infinity,
an issue noted by Bloch (1996) for a different bargaining model. Herings and Houba
(2010) show that the one-stage-deviation principle does apply for a class of bargaining
models that includes the one analyzed here and the one in Bloch (1996). Furthermore,
they derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which CPEs satisfy the traditional
equilibrium conditions. Loosely stated, these conditions for CPE require that the per-
period CPE probability of reaching some agreement is positive, which is indeed the case
since perpetual disagreement cannot occur in any CPE. In this paper, we concentrate on
the Condorcet paradox and we only apply this method.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bargaining model. Section 3
introduces the notion of CPE and characterizes the set of CPEs as the solutions to a
specific system of equations. In that section, we also derive some of the general properties
and reduce the complexity of the problem at hand. Then, Section 4 analyzes this system
by considering the four distinct cases that are related to the number of agents that have
in expectation an equilibrium utility equal to their middle alternative, where subcases
are treated in subsections. Section 5 is devoted to the study of some special cases and
examples. Section 6 combines all the conditions of Section 4 and studies the questions of
equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Section 7 analyzes the potential for delay and cycles
and Section 8 the role of risk aversion. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a decision making problem involving three agents, called players that are
labeled i = 1, 2, 3, and three possible outcomes, x1, x2, and x3. We consider the case where
the preferences of the players satisfy the following restriction
x1 1,3 x2 1,2 x3 2,3 x1. (2.1)
The formulation in (2.1) means that players 1 and 3 prefer the outcome x1 to x2, players
1 and 2 prefer the outcome x2 to x3, and players 2 and 3 prefer the outcome x3 to x1, so
the players are involved in a decision problem that gives rise to the Condorcet paradox. A
na¨ıve approach would lead to the claim that majority voting over the alternatives results
in a cycle.
Here we model majority voting over the alternatives by an explicit extensive form game.
We assume that in each period t some player, say player i, is selected randomly according
to an a priori specified probability distribution. Player i then decides either to make a
proposal to the other two players, i.e. he proposes some outcome xj, or he decides not to
make a proposal, and the players reach period t + 1. In the latter case, we will say that
player i makes proposal x0. In the former case, the other two players vote sequentially.
3
3Simultaneous voting may lead to undesirable equilibria due to coordination failures. For instance, the
case where all players vote in favor of all proposals leads to an equilibrium, as there is no player who can
gain by deviating.
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To avoid inessential multiplicity of equilibria, we assume that the player who ranks the
outcome highest, is the first one to vote.4
Table 1 illustrates the order in which players vote given a proposal by some player.
For instance, if player 1 proposes x1, then we assume that first player 3 votes and next,
conditional on a vote against by player 3, player 2. After player i makes a proposal xj, the
first player to respond is denoted by fji, the second by sji.
Proposal Sequence Proposal Sequence Proposal Sequence
(x1, 1) (3,2) (x1, 2) (1,3) (x1, 3) (1,2)
(x2, 1) (2,3) (x2, 2) (1,3) (x2, 3) (2,1)
(x3, 1) (3,2) (x3, 2) (3,1) (x3, 3) (2,1)
Table 1: The order of voting.
A voter casts a vote either in favor or against xj. If the first voter casts a vote in favor
of xj, then the outcome xj is accepted and the game ends. If the first voter votes against
xj, then the second voter is allowed to vote. If the second voter casts a vote in favor of xj,
then the outcome xj is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise, period t + 1 is reached.
In period t + 1 a new proposer is selected, and the entire procedure is repeated.
We assume that the probability of being recognized as a proposer is in each period t
given by ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3), where ρi > 0 is the probability that player i is recognized. The
preferences of the players are represented by von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions.
We normalize utilities in such a way that the utility of disagreement forever is 0 for all
players. Player i’s utility of acceptance of proposal xj in period t is equal to u
i(xj), so we
consider the case without discounting.5 To satisfy (2.1), we have that
u1(x1) > u
1(x2) > u
1(x3) ≥ 0, (2.2)
u2(x2) > u
2(x3) > u
2(x1) ≥ 0, (2.3)
u3(x3) > u
3(x1) > u
3(x2) ≥ 0. (2.4)
For i = 1, 2, 3, and j = 0, 1, 2, 3, we define uij = u
i(xj), uj = (u
1
j , u
2
j , u
3
j), u
i = (ui0, u
i
1, u
i
2, u
i
3)
>,
and u = (u1, u2, u3). For i = 1, 2, 3, we define bi, mi, and wi as the number of the alternative
related to the best, middle, and worst outcome for player i. For instance, we have b1 = 1,
m2 = 3, and w3 = 2.
The sequence of proposers, proposals, and votes defines a history. A pure strategy of a
player assigns an action to each history where he has to make a decision. We analyze mixed
strategies that are defined in the usual way. Every mixed strategy implies a probability
distribution (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3) over the four possible final outcomes, perpetual disagreement,
4Suppose player 1 proposes x2, the best outcome for player 2, and suppose that player 3 votes before
player 2. The outcome x2 is the worst outcome for player 3. Player 3 may nevertheless decide to vote in
favor of x2 since he knows that the proposal will be accepted anyhow by player 2 next and is therefore
indifferent as far as his voting behavior is concerned.
5In the presence of discounting, equilibrium existence follows from standard results on equilibrium
existence in stochastic games, see Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971). For this class of
games, Haller and Lagunoff (2000) show that the set of equilibria is generically finite. Herings and Peeters
(2004) show that generically there is an odd number of equilibria and they provide an algorithm to compute
the equilibrium that would be selected by a generalization of the tracing procedure.
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agreement on x1, agreement on x2, and agreement on x3. So, any mixed strategy implies
expected payoffs that are a weighted average of uj, j = 0, 1, 2, 3, with weights pij. Note that
pi0 > 0 implies a positive probability of the players’ worst possible outcome of perpetual
disagreement. By (2.2)–(2.4), the expected payoffs are Pareto efficient if and only if pi1 +
pi2 + pi3 = 1. Pareto efficiency rules out perpetual disagreement, i.e. pi0 = 0.
Utility functions u and recognition probabilities ρ satisfying (2.2)–(2.4) determine a
game G = (u, ρ) in extensive form. The class of all such games is denoted G.
3 Consistent Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We analyze the game by examining its consistent subgame perfect equilibria. Suppose a
player has to take an action at two subgames that are isomorphic in the sense that the
corresponding preferences and action spaces are equivalent. Then consistency requires that
the player take the same probability mix over actions in both subgames. This notion of
consistency corresponds to the “invariance with respect to isomorphisms” of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), p. 73. A subgame perfect equilibrium in consistent strategies is called a
consistent subgame perfect equilibrium (CPE).
Since the continuation game following the selection of a proposer is history independent,
we can therefore restrict ourselves to strategies where the proposal is history independent.
We denote by pij the probability that player i proposes xj when he is recognized as proposer.
Since the continuation game following a proposal by some player depends only on the
proposal made and the identity of the proposer, the rejection probability may only depend
on the identity of the proposer and the proposal made, but not on any other aspect of the
history. The continuation game starting with the last responder to a proposal depends
on the proposal made, but does not depend on the identity of the proposer. We therefore
require the response of the last responder to be independent of the identity of the proposer.
The probability that player i votes against a proposal xj by player h is denoted by r
i
jh.
As explained in the previous paragraph, the notion of a consistent strategy imposes the
requirement r132 = r
1
33, r
2
11 = r
2
13, and r
3
21 = r
3
22. For notational simplicity, we define r
i
0h = 1.
We define the set P of admissible proposals by P = P 1 × P 2 × P 3, where
P i = {pi ∈ R4+ |
∑
j=0,1,2,3
pij = 1}, i = 1, 2, 3,
and the set R of admissible rejection probabilities by R = R1 ×R2 × R3, where
Ri = {ri ∈ [0, 1]4×2 | for h, h′ 6= i, ri0h = 1 and riwih = riwih′}.
Given consistent strategies, we can compute the expected utilities of the players. It will be
useful to do so conditional on the identity of the proposer. The expected utility of player i
conditional on the proposer being player h is denoted by vih. Unconditional expected utility
of player i is zi and satisfies zi =
∑3
h=1 ρhv
i
h.
Consistency of the strategies implies that the following recursive system holds,
vih =
3∑
j=0
phj (1− rh−1jh rh+1jh )uij +
3∑
j=0
phj r
h−1
jh r
h+1
jh z
i, i = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, (3.1)
zi =
3∑
h=1
ρhv
i
h, i = 1, 2, 3. (3.2)
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In the definition of rejection probabilities above, we identify player 0 with player 3, and
player 4 with player 1. Equation (3.1) expresses that the expected utility of player i
conditional on the proposer being player h is equal to the sum over all proposals of the
probability that player h makes this proposal and that it is accepted by the other players
times the utility of the proposal plus the probability that player h makes a proposal that
is rejected times the utility zi.
Let (p, r) be a CPE. No player has a profitable deviation, so in particular, no player
has a profitable one-shot deviation. The absence of a profitable one-shot deviation is
equivalent to the following set of implications, where in (3.3) it holds that i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
pij > 0 ⇒ (1− ri−1ji ri+1ji )uij + ri−1ji ri+1ji zi = max
k∈{0,1,2,3}
(1− ri−1ki ri+1ki )uik + ri−1ki ri+1ki zi, (3.3)
rijh > 0 ⇒ zi ≥ uij or ri
′
jh = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = fjh, i
′ = sjh, (3.4)
rijh < 1 ⇒ zi ≤ uij or ri
′
jh = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = fjh, i
′ = sjh, (3.5)
rijh > 0 ⇒ zi ≥ uij, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = sjh, (3.6)
rijh < 1 ⇒ zi ≤ uij, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = sjh. (3.7)
Equality (3.3) expresses that a proposal that is made with positive probability maximizes
the sum of instantaneous utility and continuation utility. We obtain (3.4) by observing
that rijh > 0 implies (1 − ri
′
jh)u
i
j + r
i′
jhz
i ≥ uij; the utility to player i of accepting proposal
j by player h should weakly exceed the utility of rejection. This inequality is equivalent
to zi ≥ uij or ri′jh = 0. The derivation of (3.5)–(3.7) is analogous. Observe that (3.4)–(3.5)
correspond to the cases where player i is the first voter to accept or reject a proposal, and
(3.6)–(3.7) to the cases where player i is the second voter to make such a decision.
In the following, let (p, r) be a given CPE, inducing continuation utilities v and z. We
will analyze how (p, r) depends on the primitives of the model, ui and ρi, i = 1, 2, 3. We
continue by deriving several properties regarding the structure of CPEs and conclude this
section with two theorems. All these results reduce (3.3)–(3.7) to a considerably simpler
system that is analyzed in the next section. These properties are derived step by step.
The first property states that forever delay with probability 1 is not an equilibrium.
Indeed, forever delay with probability 1 implies, for every i, zi = 0 and vi = 0. By (3.3),
player 1 should obtain expected utility 0 from proposing x1, which can only be the case if
r211 = r
3
11 = 1. By (3.4), r
3
11 = 1 implies z
3 ≥ u31 or r211 = 0. This leads to a contradiction
as z3 = 0 < u31 and r
2
11 = 1. It follows that forever delay with probability 1 is not an
equilibrium.
Using the conclusion of the previous paragraph, we have that some player makes with
positive probability a proposal that is accepted with positive probability. Since such a
player is recognized with strictly positive probability, the probability that negotiations
have not terminated at period t goes to zero as t goes to infinity. In other words, at any
equilibrium there is an agreement in finite expected time with probability 1. So, pi0 = 0
and each zi is therefore a weighted average of uij, j = 1, 2, 3, with pij ∈ [0, 1] such that
pi1 + pi2 + pi3 = 1 independent of i. It holds in particular that pij > 0 for some j = 1, 2, 3
and (z1, z2, z3) 6= 0. By Herings and Houba (2010), it follows that (3.1)–(3.7) together
with (z1, z2, z3) 6= 0 is necessary and sufficient for (p, r) ∈ P × R to be a CPE inducing
continuation utilities v and z. As a corollary, some agreement with probability one implies
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the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Every CPE is Pareto efficient.
This result shows that bargaining under exogenous recognition probabilities is a road
map to overcome the Condorcet paradox. The generality of this result holds for all pa-
rameter values for which the bargaining model has at least one CPE and it is therefore
unrestricted in the sense that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
CPE immediately imply Pareto efficiency. Given the indeterminacy of many cooperative
theories about the Condorcet paradox, this result already suggests a great potential in
further elaborating the bargaining approach.
In the next step, we show that each player i has zi strictly exceeding the utility uiwi of
his worst outcome. Suppose, on the contrary, that player i has zi = uiwi. The probability
is therefore 1 that the outcome xwi is accepted at some point in time, since otherwise the
utility of i strictly exceeds uiwi. Therefore, with probability 1, player i− 1 gets utility ui−1bi−1
and player i+1 utility ui+1mi+1 . Moreover, it follows that z
i−1 = ui−1bi−1 and z
i+1 = ui+1mi+1 . Since
ui−1mi = u
i−1
wi−1
< ui−1bi−1 = z
i−1, (3.7) yields that player i − 1 rejects proposal xmi by player
i with probability 1, so ri−1mii = 1. Since r
i−1
mii
= 1 and zi+1 = ui+1mi+1 < u
i+1
bi+1
= ui+1mi , (3.4)
yields that player i + 1 rejects proposal xmi by player i with probability 0. Proposal xmi
by player i is therefore accepted with probability 1, so vii ≥ uimi > uiwi. Since vii−1 ≥ uiwi
and vii+1 ≥ uiwi, we find that uiwi = zi = ρ1vi1 + ρ2vi2 + ρ3vi3 > uiwi, a contradiction. We
conclude that each player has zi strictly exceeding uiwi, i.e.
zi > uiwi, i = 1, 2, 3. (3.8)
We show next that each player i has zi strictly lower than the utility of his best outcome,
uibi. If some player i has z
i = uibi , then outcome xbi is accepted with probability 1, so
zi+1 = ui+1bi = u
i+1
wi+1
, a contradiction to (3.8). We have found that
zi < uibi, i = 1, 2, 3. (3.9)
Next, any voter rejects his worst alternative for sure. To see this, when player h proposes
outcome xwi, i 6= h, then player i is the last one to vote. It holds by (3.8) that zi > uiwi,
so by (3.7), riwih = 1. We have shown that
riwih = 1, i = 1, 2, 3, h 6= i. (3.10)
Notice that (3.10) implies proposer-independent probabilities of rejecting r132 = r
1
33, r
2
11 =
r213, and r
3
21 = r
3
22 as required in the definition of R.
We continue by establishing that, independent of who proposes, the recognized player
can always conclude the bargaining for sure by proposing either his worst or his middle
alternative. Consider a proposal xmi by player i, so player i proposes his middle outcome
and player i + 1, for whom it is the best alternative, votes before player i − 1. We argue
that this proposal will be accepted with probability 1 by player i + 1, i.e. ri+1mii = 0. By
(3.10), since mi = wi−1, r
i−1
mii
= 1. Using that mi = bi+1, we know by (3.9), u
i+1
mi
> zi+1.
Since ri−1mii = 1, we use (3.4) to conclude that r
i+1
mii
= 0. We have derived that
r221 = r
3
32 = r
1
13 = 0. (3.11)
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Consider now a proposal xwi by player i meaning player i proposes his worst outcome. We
argue that this proposal will be accepted with probability one, i.e. ri−1wii r
i+1
wii
= 0. Since
wi = bi−1, it follows from (3.9) that u
i−1
wi
> zi−1, so by (3.4), ri−1wii = 0 or r
i+1
wii
= 0. We have
derived that
r231r
3
31 = r
1
12r
3
12 = r
1
23r
2
23 = 0. (3.12)
As a corollary, a recognized player will never propose his worst alternative, because he can
do strictly better by proposing his second best, i.e.
piwi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. (3.13)
We have already argued that each zi is a weighted average of uij, j = 1, 2, 3, with
weights pij independent of i. We argue next that all weights are strictly positive. If only one
weight would be strictly positive, we would get a contradiction to (3.8) for some i. Suppose
that exactly two weights are strictly positive, without loss of generality the weights pi1 on
outcome x1 and pi2 on x2 sum up to one and pi3 = 0, so z
i = pi1u
i
1 + pi2u
i
2. For the equality
pi3 = 0 to hold, the proposal x3 by player 3 should be rejected with probability 1. The
proposal x1 by player 3 is accepted with probability 1 according to (3.11). We can now use
(3.3) to conclude that p30 = p
3
3 = 0, and since p
3
2 = 0 by (3.13), we know that p
3
1 = 1. From
(3.4) and (3.10), the proposal x1 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 by player 3.
The proposal x2 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 according to (3.11). We can
now use (3.3) to conclude that p10 = p
1
2 = 0, and since p
1
3 = 0 by (3.13), we know that
p11 = 1. A proposal x2 by player 2 would be rejected with probability 1 by player 1 using
(3.5) and the fact that r322 = 1 by (3.10). It now follows that pi1 = 1, a contradiction to
(3.8). We conclude that all weights are strictly positive,
pi1, pi2, pi3 > 0.
So far we have characterized the set of consistent subgame perfect equilibria as the set
of solutions (p, r) ∈ P × R to (3.1)–(3.7) leading to utility levels z 6= 0. The next result
claims that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to proposer-independent
rejection probabilities.
Theorem 3.2 If (p, r) ∈ P × R is a consistent subgame perfect equilibrium inducing
utilities v and z, then there is also a consistent subgame perfect equilibrium (p, r¯) ∈ P ×R
inducing utilities v and z such that r¯ is proposer-independent, i.e. r¯ijh = r¯
i
jh′ for all i, j, h,
and h′. Moreover, r¯ can be defined by setting, for i = 1, 2, 3, r¯ibii+1 = 0, r¯
i
mii−1
= rimii+1,
and r¯ijh = r
i
jh, otherwise.
Proof: Assume that (p, r) ∈ P × R satisfies (3.1)–(3.7). We show that (p, r¯) satisfies
(3.1)–(3.7), where r¯ is as defined in Theorem 3.1. We verify first that r¯ is proposer inde-
pendent. Indeed, for i = 1, 2, 3, we have the following. It holds by definition that r¯i0h = 1,
h 6= i. We have by definition that r¯ibii+1 = 0 and r¯ibii−1 = ribii−1 = 0, where the last equality
holds by (3.11). Also it holds by definition that r¯imii+1 = r
i
mii+1
and r¯imii−1 = r
i
mii+1
, so
r¯imii+1 = r¯
i
mii−1
. Finally, we have riwih = 1, h 6= i, by (3.10), and r¯iwih = riwih, h 6= i, by
definition.
We show next that
rh−1jh r
h+1
jh = r¯
h−1
jh r¯
h+1
jh , h = 1, 2, 3, j = 0, 1, 2, 3. (3.14)
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For j = 0, this follows immediately from the definition of R. Three possible cases remain:
(i) j = bh, (ii) j = mh, and (iii) j = wh.
Case (i), j = bh. Since bh = mh−1 = wh+1, we have
r¯h−1bhh r¯
h+1
bhh
= r¯h−1mh−1hr¯
h+1
wh+1h
= rh−1mh−1hr
h+1
wh+1h
= rh−1bhh r
h+1
bhh
,
where the second equality follows by definition of r¯.
Case (ii), j = mh. Since mh = wh−1 = bh+1, we obtain
r¯h−1mhhr¯
h+1
mhh
= r¯h−1wh−1hr¯
h+1
bh+1h
= rh−1wh−1hr
h+1
bh+1h
= rh−1mhhr
h+1
mhh
,
where the second equality follows by definition of r¯.
Case (iii), j = wh. By (3.12), it holds that r
h−1
whh
rh+1whh = 0. Since wh = bh−1, we have
that r¯h−1whh = r¯
h−1
bh−1h
= 0, where the last equality follows by definition of r¯. It follows that
r¯h−1whhr¯
h+1
whh
= 0.
Using (3.14) we have that (p, r¯, v, z) satisfies (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3). We verify next that
(p, r¯, v, z) satisfies (3.4)–(3.7). Consider some r¯ijh. If j = bi, then r¯
i
jh = 0 and i = fjh, so
(3.4), (3.6), and (3.7) hold trivially. Implication (3.5) holds as well, since zi < uibi by (3.9).
If j = wi, then r¯
i
jh = r
i
jh = 1 by (3.10), so (3.5) and (3.7) hold trivially. Since by (3.8)
zi > uiwi, we find that (3.4) and (3.6) also hold. If j = mi and h = i + 1, then i = fjh, so
(3.6) and (3.7) hold trivially. We have that r¯ijh = r
i
jh and r¯
i′
jh = r¯
i−1
wi−1i+1
= ri−1wi−1i+1 = r
i′
jh,
so (3.4) and (3.5) hold. Finally, we consider the case where j = mi and h = i−1, so i = sjh
and (3.4) and (3.5) hold trivially. Assume r¯ijh > 0. Since by definition r¯
i
jh = r¯
i
mii−1
= rimii+1,
we have rimii+1 > 0, so by (3.4) z
i ≥ uimi or ri−1mii+1 = 0. Since mi = wi−1, (3.10) implies
ri−1mii+1 = 1, so z
i ≥ uimi . It follows that (3.6) holds. Assume r¯ijh < 1. Since by definition
r¯ijh = r¯
i
mii−1
= rimii+1, we have r
i
mii+1
< 1, so by (3.5) zi ≤ uimi or ri−1mii+1 = 0. Since
mi = wi−1, (3.10) implies r
i−1
mii+1
= 1, so zi ≥ uimi. It follows that (3.7) holds. Q.E.D.
The bargaining model may admit multiple CPEs that support the same utilities z and
v. Such multiplicity is inessential in terms of characterizing expected equilibrium utilities.
The importance of Theorem 3.2 is that it identifies a systematic way in reducing the number
of unknowns without discarding any pair z and v of equilibrium utilities. This theorem
implies that every pair z and v of CPE utilities can be supported by proposer-independent
rejection probabilities and analyzing such probabilities reduces the number of unknowns.
Since some of the previous results, such as each player always rejects his worst al-
ternative, already hinted at proposer-independent probabilities, Theorem 3.2 is especially
selective in subgames in which the current proposer chose to put up his worst alternative for
a vote. Recall that such subgames are never reached in any CPE, but the CPE implies that
such a proposal would be accepted with probability one, i.e. player i−1 proposed wi−1 and
ri+1bi+1i−1r
i
mii−1
= 0. Of course, rimii−1 has to satisfy the equilibrium condition in the subgame
where i + 1, for whom it is the best alternative, voted against. In case rimii−1 = 0 would
be the equilibrium probability, the requirement ri+1bi+1i−1r
i
mii−1
= 0 leads to indeterminacy
of ri+1bi+1i−1 ∈ [0, 1]. So, the CPE strategies do not force a player to accept for sure his best
alternative in this case, in case the next voter will accept for sure.6 More generally, in case
6Since a player always rejects his third-best alternative, this indeterminacy is ruled out when player i
proposed wi−1 instead of player i− 1 , because then i + 1 votes before i− 1, who rejects for sure, making
i + 1 accept for sure.
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player i would be indifferent between accepting mi proposed by player i−1 or rejecting mi,
then ri+1bi+1i−1r
i
mii−1
= 0 implies indeterminacy of either ri+1bi+1i−1 ∈ [0, 1] or rimii−1 ∈ [0, 1]. In
that case, Theorem 3.2 identifies r¯i+1bi+1i−1 = r¯
i+1
bi+1i
= 0 and r¯imii−1 = r¯
i
mii+1
= rimii+1. Apart
from being simpler, the proposer-independent rejection probabilities identified in Theorem
3.2 also are more intuitive. In particular, other CPE strategies supporting the same z and
v are less intuitive when refraining from accepting a best alternative for sure.
By virtue of Theorem 3.2, we may drop the subscript indicating the proposer from the
notation of a rejection probability. The set of proposer-independent rejection probabilities
is Q = Q1 ×Q2 ×Q3, where
Qi = {qi ∈ [0, 1]4 | qi0 = 1}.
We have already argued that each zi is a weighted average of uij, j = 1, 2, 3, with weights
pij independent of i. We argue next that all these weights are strictly positive. If only one
weight would be strictly positive, we would get a contradiction to (3.8) for some i. Suppose
that exactly two weights are strictly positive, without loss of generality the weights pi1 on
outcome x1 and pi2 on x2 sum up to one and pi3 = 0, so z
i = pi1u
i
1 + pi2u
i
2. For the equality
pi3 = 0 to hold, the proposal x3 by player 3 should be rejected with probability 1. The
proposal x1 by player 3 is accepted with probability 1 according to (3.11). We can now use
(3.3) to conclude that p30 = p
3
3 = 0, and since p
3
2 = 0 by (3.13), we know that p
3
1 = 1. From
(3.4) and (3.10), the proposal x1 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 by player 3.
The proposal x2 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 according to (3.11). We can
now use (3.3) to conclude that p10 = p
1
2 = 0, and since p
1
3 = 0 by (3.13), we know that
p11 = 1. A proposal x2 by player 2 would be rejected with probability 1 by player 1 using
(3.5) and the fact that r322 = 1 by (3.10). It now follows that pi1 = 1, a contradiction to
(3.8). We conclude that all weights are strictly positive,
pi1, pi2, pi3 > 0.
Recall that at any equilibrium there is agreement within finite expected time with proba-
bility 1. Consequently, also pi1 + pi2 + pi3 = 1.
We summarize what we have found so far. At a CPE (p, q¯) ∈ P × Q an agreement
is eventually reached with probability one, and all outcomes occur with strictly positive
probability. Therefore, any CPE is Pareto efficient. The expected equilibrium utility is
strictly in between the utility of a player’s worst outcome and a player’s best outcome.
If a player proposes his middle outcome, it is accepted for sure since for every player i it
holds that q¯ibi = 0. If a player would propose his worst outcome, it would also be accepted
for sure, implying that no player ever proposes his worst outcome, i.e. for every player i,
piwi = 0. Moreover, a player rejects his worst outcome for sure, i.e. for every i, q¯
i
wi
= 1.
The only variables that have not yet been determined are pi0, p
i
mi
, pibi , and q¯
i
mi
.
It seems intuitive that in any CPE (p, q¯) ∈ P ×Q with utilities v and z, the recognized
player is better off making some proposal instead of not making a proposal, i.e. pi0 = 0. As
we will show in Section 4.1, for some parameter values we can have pi0 > 0 for some i. In
such cases, however, we will show that there also exists a closely related CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P×Q
with p¯i0 = 0 for all players i that yields the same pair of utilities v and z. This implies
that in characterizing the set of CPEs, we may first search for equilibria (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q
with p¯i0 = 0 for all players i. This is without loss of generality in the sense that if there is
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an equilibrium (p, q¯) involving pi0 6= 0 for some i, then there is also an equilibrium (p¯, q¯)
where p¯ibi = p
i
bi
+ pi0, p¯
i
0 = 0, and p¯j = pj for j 6= 0, bi. Indeed, by the definition of equi-
librium it should not be profitable to propose xbi instead of x0. This means that either xbi
is rejected with probability 1 when proposed or zi = uibi. The latter case contradicts (3.9),
so we only have to consider the former case. Since we are considering CPEs, the change
in strategy from not making a proposal to proposing one’s best outcome, which is rejected
with probability 1, is not affecting the payoffs of anyone, and is also an equilibrium. The
next proposition gives an easy characterization of CPEs (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q where no player
gives up the right to make a proposal, i.e. p¯i0 = 0 for all players i.
Theorem 3.3 The strategy profile (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q is a CPE where all players make a
proposal with probability one if and only if for i = 1, 2, 3, p¯i0 = p¯
i
wi
= 0, q¯ibi = 0, q¯
i
wi
= 1,
and there is p¯i ∈ R3++ and z¯ ∈ R3 such that
p¯imi > 0 ⇒ uimi ≥ (1− q¯i−1mi−1)uibi + q¯i−1mi−1 z¯i, i = 1, 2, 3, (3.15)
p¯ibi > 0 ⇒ (1− q¯i−1mi−1)uibi + q¯i−1mi−1 z¯i ≥ uimi , i = 1, 2, 3, (3.16)
q¯imi > 0 ⇒ z¯i ≥ uimi, i = 1, 2, 3, (3.17)
q¯imi < 1 ⇒ z¯i ≤ uimi, i = 1, 2, 3, (3.18)
p¯i1u
i
1 + p¯i2u
i
2 + p¯i3u
i
3 = z¯
i, i = 1, 2, 3, (3.19)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (3.20)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 = ρ1p¯
1
b1
(1− q¯31) + ρ3p¯3m3 : ρ2p¯2b2(1− q¯12) + ρ1p¯1m1 , (3.21)
p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ2p¯
2
b2
(1− q¯12) + ρ1p¯1m1 : ρ3p¯3b3(1− q¯23) + ρ2p¯2m2 . (3.22)
Proof:
(⇒) This direction follows immediately from the results derived in this section.
(⇐) This direction follows by defining, for h = 1, 2, 3, i = 1, 2, 3, and j = 0, 1, 2, 3,
v¯ih = p¯
h
mh
uimh + p¯
h
bh
(1− q¯h−1bh )uibh + p¯hbh q¯h−1bh z¯i,
r¯ijh = q¯
i
j,
and verifying that a solution (p¯, q¯, p¯i, z¯) to (3.15)–(3.22) inducing expected utilities v¯ and
rejection probabilities r¯ leads to a solution (p¯, r¯, v¯, z¯) to (3.1)–(3.7) with z¯ 6= 0. Q.E.D.
4 Equilibrium Types
The results of the previous section show that player i faces two dilemmas. First, by
what probability will I propose my middle alternative xmi knowing it will be accepted
for sure instead of taking the risk involved in proposing my best alternative. Second, by
what probability will I reject my middle alternative xmi when offered to me knowing that
rejecting it leads to a gamble over my top three alternatives including my worst. These
dilemmas concern the equilibrium values of pimi and q
i
mi
that also pin down pibi = 1− pimi.
The answer to the first dilemma results in four possible types of equilibrium. The
first one is where all players i have a strictly positive p¯imi . The other types of equilibria are
characterized by two, one, and none of the players having a strictly positive p¯imi . We devote
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one subsection to each of these types. The answer to the second dilemma is intimately
related to the value of z¯i. We will show that all equilibria have the property that z¯i ≤ uimi .
Then it follows that q¯imi = 0 if z¯
i < uimi, whereas strictly positive values for q¯
i
mi
are admitted
when z¯i = uimi.
For the cases with one and none of the players having a strictly positive p¯imi there
exist two, respectively four, equilibrium subtypes, depending on the number of players
with z¯i = uimi . For the other cases we do not have to distinguish subtypes. In the type of
equilibrium where one player has a strictly positive p¯imi , without loss of generality player 1,
we can show that in equilibrium q¯31 = 0 and q¯
2
3 > 0. Two equilibrium subtypes occur for
z¯1 = u12 and z¯
1 < u12, respectively. In the equilibrium type where no player has a strictly
positive p¯imi, four subtypes occur, with one subtype for each possible number of players
with z¯i = uimi. The equilibrium subtypes are analyzed in subsubsections. In the final
subsection, we provide a table that summarizes the results obtained for all subtypes.
4.1 Three Players with p¯imi > 0.
In this subsection we are analyzing equilibria where every player makes a proposal with
probability one, proposes his middle alternative with strictly positive probability, does not
propose his worst alternative, and may propose his best alternative with strictly positive
probability less than one.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi, q¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (3.15)–
(3.22) with p¯imi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3. From (3.15), for every i, u
i
mi
≥ (1 − q¯i−1mi−1)uibi + q¯i−1mi−1 z¯i,
so z¯i ≤ uimi . We argue next that for every i, z¯i = uimi. Suppose, for some i, z¯i < uimi .
Then q¯imi = 0 by (3.17), so p¯
i+1
mi+1
= 0 by (3.15), a contradiction since we are considering
the case p¯i+1mi+1 > 0. It follows that for every i, z¯
i = uimi, and by (3.15), q¯
i−1
mi−1
= 1, so the
proposal xmi by a player i is accepted with probability 1 and the proposal xbi by a player i
is rejected with probability 1. Note that since a proposal xbi by player i is rejected for sure,
player i is indifferent between making such a proposal and giving up the right to propose,
i.e. propose x0.
Equations (3.19)–(3.20) now reduce to the system
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (4.1)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (4.2)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 = u
3
1, (4.3)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1. (4.4)
Equations (3.21) and (3.22) can be simplified to
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ3p¯
3
m3
: ρ1p¯
1
m1
: ρ2p¯
2
m2
. (4.5)
Whenever utilities are such that (4.1)–(4.4) has a solution p¯i  0, an equilibrium of the
type we are looking for in this subsection exists. We derive now under what assumptions
on utilities such a solution p¯i exists. We will show that there is at most one solution, so a
solution, if it exists, is unique.
It will be useful to introduce the notation ∆ik for the utility difference between the k-
best outcome and (k+1)-best outcome for agent i. More precisely, we define ∆i1 = u
i
bi
−uimi
and ∆i2 = u
i
mi
− uiwi. Moreover, we define ∆i3 = ∆i1 + ∆i2, so it holds that ∆i3 = uibi − uiwi.
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From equalities (4.1) and (4.4), we obtain
(1− p¯i2)∆12 = p¯i1∆13. (4.6)
Combining (4.2) and (4.4) leads to
p¯i1∆
2
2 = p¯i2∆
2
1 (4.7)
= ∆21 − p¯i1
∆13∆
2
1
∆12
,
where the second equality follows using (4.6). Rewriting the last equality leads to
p¯i1 =
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
It is immediate that 0 < p¯i1 < 1.
By (4.7) we have p¯i2 = p¯i1∆
2
2/∆
2
1, and we find that
p¯i2 =
∆12∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
Since p¯i3 = 1− p¯i1 − p¯i2, we find that
p¯i3 =
∆11∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
Obviously, it holds that 0 < p¯i2 < 1 and 0 < p¯i3 < 1. At this point we have established that
there is at most one solution to (4.1)–(4.4). For there to be some solution, (4.3) should
hold. Using the already derived expressions for p¯i1, p¯i2, and p¯i3, we find that (4.3) holds if
and only if
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2.
This equation holds in degenerate cases only. It requires that the product over the players
of the utility difference between their best and middle alternative be exactly equal to the
product of the utility difference between the middle and the worst alternative.
A game (u, ρ) with ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2 has many equilibria (p¯, q¯) of the type described
in this subsection. All such equilibria can be constructed as follows. Let p¯i be the uniquely
determined probabilities by which the alternatives are implemented at equilibrium. Let
λ > 0 be such that, for i = 1, 2, 3, λp¯imi ≤ ρi. If player i is selected as proposer, he proposes
xmi with probability λp¯imi/ρi and xbi with probability 1 − λp¯imi/ρi. The former proposal
is accepted, the latter rejected. This construction ensures that (4.5) holds. The higher λ,
the less delay before an outcome is accepted. The highest possible choice of λ occurs when
there is at least one player i for which p¯imi = 1. In that case, the selection of player i as a
proposer leads to a proposal that is accepted for sure.
Summarizing, we have the following. Let utilities be such that ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2,
so there is a unique solution p¯i  0 to (4.1)–(4.4). Then the set of CPEs with all players
making a proposal with probability one is given by
p¯ =


0 0 0
1− p¯1m1 0 p¯3m3
p¯1m1 1− p¯2m2 0
0 p¯2m2 1− p¯3m3

 (4.8)
14
q¯1 =


1
0
1
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
1

 , and q¯3 =


1
1
1
0

 , (4.9)
where p¯ satisfies (4.5). The other CPEs are obtained by transferring part or all of the
probability 1 − p¯imi by which xbi is proposed by player i to the option not to make a
proposal, x0.
In this CPE, each player randomizes between his security utility uimi , knowing it will
be accepted for sure by player i + 1, and some gamble among all three alternatives in case
he either proposes his best alternative, knowing the latter will be rejected for sure, or does
not make a proposal at all. In this gamble, at some future date either player i−1 proposes
player i’s best alternative and player i accepts, or player i + 1 may propose player i’s
worst alternative but since this is player i − 1’s best alternative the latter player accepts,
or player i proposes his middle alternative, which is accepted by player i + 1. Notice that
all equilibria are symmetric whenever the recognition probabilities (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3) are identical
to (p¯i2, p¯i3, p¯i1), because the latter ensures that the probabilities of proposing the middle
alternative are equal. In that case there is one equilibrium without delay, i.e. pimi = 1 for
all i. All other equilibria involve delay.
All CPEs (p¯, q¯) lead to the same equilibrium payoffs z¯ given by z¯i = uimi . We have
uniqueness in equilibrium utilities but multiplicity in the supporting equilibrium strategies.
therefore, as mentioned before, the multiplicity of equilibria is inessential. Since also
v¯ii = u
i
mi
= z¯i, there is no advantage in being the proposer. The recognition probabilities
ρ do not influence the probability p¯ij that the bargaining process ends with outcome xj.
These probabilities depend on the utilities only.
We can summarize our findings regarding equilibrium existence in the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 4.1 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯imi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, if and only
if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. In this case, there is a unique CPE with minimal expected delay,
given by the solution (p¯, q¯) to (4.5), (4.8), and (4.9) with p¯imi = 1 for at least one player
i, where (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) is the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.4). Other CPEs are obtained by
proportionally lowering p¯imi across players i, as well as by shifting probability weight from
p¯ibi to p¯
i
0. All CPEs induce the same equilibrium utilities, given by z¯
i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3.
4.2 Two Players with p¯imi > 0.
Next we consider equilibria where one player, without loss of generality player 1, proposes
his best outcome for sure, and the other two players put strictly positive weight on their
middle outcome. We argue that no such equilibria exist.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi, q¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (3.15)–
(3.22) with p¯11 = 1, p¯
2
3 > 0, and p¯
3
1 > 0. By (3.15), (1 − q¯12)u22 + q¯12 z¯2 ≤ u23, so z¯2 ≤ u23.
Suppose z¯2 < u23. Then q¯
2
3 = 0 by (3.17), so p¯
3
1 = 0 by (3.15), a contradiction to p¯
3
1 > 0. It
follows that z¯2 = u23. Now (3.15) implies u
2
3 ≥ (1− q¯12)u22 + q¯12u23, so q¯12 = 1. It follows that if
player 2 proposes his best alternative, it is rejected for sure. No other player ever proposes
this alternative. The bargaining process never ends with outcome x2, i.e. p¯i2 = 0. This is
a contradiction to p¯i2 > 0. We conclude that there are no equilibria with the properties as
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stated in this subsection.
Theorem 4.2 There is no CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with for some i = 1, 2, 3, p¯imi = 0,
p¯i−1mi−1 > 0, and p¯
i+1
mi+1
> 0.
4.3 One Player with p¯imi > 0.
Now we consider equilibria with two players proposing their best outcome for sure, and
where one player, without loss of generality player 3, puts strictly positive weight on his
middle outcome.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi, q¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (3.15)–
(3.22) with p¯11 = 1, p¯
2
2 = 1, and p¯
3
1 > 0. So, player 1 proposes x1, player 2 proposes x2, and
player 3 mixes over x3 and x1. To obtain p¯ij > 0, j = 1, 2, 3, we must have p¯
3
3 > 0, q¯
1
2 < 1,
and q¯23 < 1. By (3.15) and (3.16) we find
(1− q¯31)u11 + q¯31 z¯1 ≥ u12,
(1− q¯12)u22 + q¯12 z¯2 ≥ u23,
(1− q¯23)u33 + q¯23 z¯3 = u31.
Since q¯23 < 1 and u
3
3 > u
3
1, the equality implies q¯
2
3 ∈ (0, 1) and z¯3 < u31. It follows by (3.17)
and (3.18) that z¯2 = u23. Since z¯
3 < u31, we have q¯
3
1 = 0 by (3.17), so the proposal of player 1
is accepted for sure. By q¯12 < 1 and (3.18), we also must have z¯
1 ≤ u12. There are now two
possible cases. Case 1 where z¯1 = u12 and Case 2 with z¯
1 < u12. In Case 2 we have q¯
1
2 = 0
by (3.17).
4.3.1 Case 1
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 1− p¯33
0 1 0
0 0 p¯33

 (4.10)
q¯1 =


1
0
q¯12
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
q¯23

 , and q¯3 =


1
0
1
0

 , (4.11)
(1− q¯23)u33 + q¯23(p¯i1u31 + p¯i2u32 + p¯i3u33) = u31, (4.12)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (4.13)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (4.14)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (4.15)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (4.16)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33) : ρ2(1− q¯12) : ρ3p¯33(1− q¯23), (4.17)
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where 0 < p¯33 < 1, 0 ≤ q¯12 < 1, and 0 < q¯23 < 1.
Using the same derivation as in Subsection 4.1, it can be shown that there is a solution
p¯i  0 to the system (4.13)–(4.16) if and only if
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. (4.18)
Moreover, each specification of utilities satisfying (4.18) leads to a unique solution p¯i  0
to (4.13)–(4.16). Indeed, as before it holds that
p¯i1 =
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
p¯i2 =
∆12∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
p¯i3 =
∆11∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
Inequality (4.18) specifies that the product over the players of the utility difference between
their best and middle alternative should be less than the product of the utility difference
between the middle and worst alternative.
Rewriting (4.12), we obtain
q¯23 =
∆31
p¯i1∆
3
1 + p¯i2∆
3
3
,
and substitution of the expressions for p¯i1 and p¯i2 results in
q¯23 =
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
1
∆12∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2
. (4.19)
Notice that 0 < q¯23 < 1. By (4.17) we have
∆12
∆11
=
ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33)
ρ3p¯33(1− q¯23)
.
Substitution of the expression for q¯23 in the latter equation, and then solving for p¯
3
3 results
in
p¯33 =
ρ1 + ρ3
ρ3
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
2
∆11∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2
. (4.20)
Obviously, it holds that p¯33 > 0. Moreover, we have that p¯
3
3 < 1 if and only if
ρ1
ρ3
<
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
2
(<
∆12
∆11
). (4.21)
By (4.17) we have
∆21
∆22
=
ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33)
ρ2(1− q¯12)
.
17
We substitute the expression found for p¯33 and solve the resulting equation for q¯
1
2 , and
obtain that
1− q¯12 =
ρ1 + ρ3
ρ2
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
2
. (4.22)
This expression is clearly strictly positive. It is less than or equal to one if and only if
ρ2 ≥ ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2
. (4.23)
Since all players i propose their best outcome xbi with strictly positive probability, and
since q¯31 = 0, q¯
1
2 < 1, and q¯
2
3 < 1 implies that such a proposal is accepted with strictly
positive probability, no player wants to use the option not to make a proposal. Finally, the
equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯12 = 0, p¯23 = 0, p¯31 > 0, and
z¯1 ≥ u12 if and only if ∆11∆21∆31 < ∆12∆22∆32 and ρ is such that (4.21) and (4.23) are sat-
isfied. In this case, such CPE is unique. It is given by (4.10), (4.11), (4.19), (4.20), and
(4.22). The equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
For given utilities satisfying (4.18), (4.21) requires ρ3 to be sufficiently high compared
to ρ1, and (4.23) requires ρ2 to be sufficiently high.
To summarize, players 1 and 2 propose their best alternative whenever they are the
recognized player. Player 1’s best alternative is accepted for sure, whereas player 2’s best
alternative may be rejected with positive probability. By proposing his best alternative,
this player chooses the risky option over his riskless security utility u2m2 . Player 3’s proposal
consists of randomizing between his best and middle alternative. Notice that, unlike the
equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, players never use the option to refrain from making a proposal,
i.e., pi0 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. Since conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy v¯
i
i > z¯
i, i = 1, 2, 3, each
player enjoys an advantage whenever he is the recognized player. Moreover, conditional
on being the recognized player, player 1 achieves his best alternative, player 2 is strictly
better off compared to his security level, and player 3 is kept at his security level. In
many bargaining models, the advantage to propose vanishes in taking the limit to the no
discounting case. Here the advantage is present under no discounting.7
The equilibrium leads to a strictly positive expected delay. The reason is that player 3
is recognized with strictly positive probability and proposes x3 with strictly positive proba-
bility. This proposal is rejected by both players with strictly positive probability. Player 1
always proposes x1, which is accepted by player 3. Player 2 always proposes x2, which
is accepted by player 1 with strictly probability 1 − q¯12 and is rejected by both players
otherwise.
Using a straightforward relabeling of the players, we find fully symmetric results for
equilibria with p¯22 = p¯
3
3 = 1 and player 1 mixing between x1 and x2, and equilibria with
p¯11 = p¯
3
3 = 1 and player 2 mixing between x2 and x3.
7Houba (2008) reports a case with persistence of this advantage in bilateral alternating-offers bargaining.
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4.3.2 Case 2
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 1− p¯33
0 1 0
0 0 p¯33

 (4.24)
q¯1 =


1
0
0
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
q¯23

 , and q¯3 =


1
0
1
0

 , (4.25)
(1− q¯23)u33 + q¯23
(
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3
)
= u31, (4.26)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 < u
1
2, (4.27)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (4.28)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (4.29)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (4.30)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33) : ρ2 : ρ3p¯33(1− q¯23), (4.31)
where 0 < p¯33 < 1 and 0 < q¯
2
3 < 1.
We can rewrite (4.26)–(4.29) as
∆31 − q¯23(p¯i1∆31 + p¯i2∆33) = 0, (4.32)
p¯i1∆
1
1 − p¯i3∆12 < 0, (4.33)
−p¯i1∆22 + p¯i2∆21 = 0, (4.34)
−p¯i2∆32 + p¯i3∆31 < 0. (4.35)
We have a system (4.30), (4.31), (4.32), (4.34) with five equations in the five unknowns p¯i1,
p¯i2, p¯i3, p¯
3
3, and q¯
2
3 . Solving this system results in outcome probabilities
p¯i1 =
∆21∆
3
1 + ρ2∆
2
1∆
3
2
∆21∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
2
,
p¯i2 =
∆22∆
3
1 + ρ2∆
2
2∆
3
2
∆21∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
2
,
p¯i3 =
∆22∆
3
2 − ρ2∆23∆32
∆21∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
2
2∆
3
2
,
and equilibrium action probabilities
p¯33 =
ρ1∆
2
2 − ρ2∆21 + ρ3∆22
ρ3∆22
, (4.36)
q¯23 =
∆31
∆31 + ρ2∆
3
2
. (4.37)
It is immediate that the solution satisfies 0 < q¯23 < 1.
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The inequality (4.33) is equivalent to
ρ2 <
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2
(<
∆22
∆21 + ∆
2
2
). (4.38)
The inequality (4.35) is always satisfied.
The requirement p¯33 > 0 is equivalent to ρ2 < ∆
2
2/∆
2
3, which implies p¯i3 > 0. This
requirement follows from (4.38). The requirement p¯33 < 1 is equivalent to
ρ1
ρ2
<
∆21
∆22
. (4.39)
Since all players i propose their best outcome xbi with strictly positive probability, and
since q¯31 = 0, q¯
1
2 = 0, and q¯
2
3 < 1 implies that such a proposal is accepted with strictly posi-
tive probability, no player wants to use the option not to make a proposal. We summarize
our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.2 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P×Q with p¯12 = 0, p¯23 = 0, p¯31 > 0, and z¯1 < u12
if and only if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2 and ρ is such that (4.38) and (4.39) are satisfied. In
this case, a CPE is unique. It is given by (4.24), (4.25), (4.36), and (4.37). Equilibrium
utilities satisfy z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
For given utilities satisfying (4.18), (4.38) requires ρ2 to be sufficiently low. It com-
plements (4.23) which implies that equilibria as in Case 1 cannot coexist with those as in
Case 2. Inequality (4.39) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently low compared to ρ2. Notice that,
like the equilibrium of Theorem 4.3.1, the option not to make a proposal cannot be chosen
with any positive probability.
The equilibrium leads to a strictly positive expected delay. The reason is that player 3
is recognized with strictly positive probability, proposes x3 with strictly positive probabil-
ity, which is rejected by both players with strictly positive probability. The proposals of
players 1 and 2 are accepted for sure. Similar to the previous case, all three players have
an advantage to propose. Conditional on being the recognized player, player 3 cannot do
better than getting the utility of his middle alternative. Conditional on being the proposer,
both player 1 and player 2 achieve the utility of the best alternative.
By a relabeling of the players, we find fully symmetric results for equilibria with p¯22 =
p¯33 = 1 and player 1 mixing between x1 and x2, and equilibria with p¯
1
1 = p¯
3
3 = 1 and player 2
mixing between x2 and x3.
4.4 No Player with p¯imi > 0.
We finally consider equilibria where all players propose their best outcome for sure. Let
(p¯ibi , p¯
i
mi
, q¯imi , z¯
i) be a solution to (3.15)–(3.22) with p¯11 = p¯
2
2 = p¯
3
3 = 1. To obtain p¯ij > 0,
j = 1, 2, 3, we must have q¯31 < 1, q¯
1
2 < 1, and q¯
2
3 < 1. If follows from (3.18) that z¯
1 ≤ u12,
z¯2 ≤ u23, and z¯3 ≤ u31. Since all players propose their best outcome with strictly positive
probability, and since such a proposal is accepted with strictly positive probability, no
player wants to use the option not to make a proposal. We distinguish four possible cases
of interest. In Case 1, there are three players with z¯i = uimi , in Case 2 there are two such
players, without loss of generality, players 1 and 2, in Case 3 there is one such player,
without loss of generality player 1, and in Case 4 all players have z¯i < uimi.
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4.4.1 Case 1
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 (4.40)
q¯1 =


1
0
q¯12
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
q¯23

 , and q¯3 =


1
q¯31
1
0

 , (4.41)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2,
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3,
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 = u
3
1,
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1(1− q¯31) : ρ2(1− q¯12) : ρ3(1− q¯23). (4.42)
As in Section 4.1 we obtain that
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2, (4.43)
p¯i1 =
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
, (4.44)
p¯i2 =
∆12∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
, (4.45)
p¯i3 =
∆11∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
. (4.46)
The CPE is not unique. Let λ > 0 be such that, for i = 1, 2, 3, λp¯imi ≤ ρmi . If player i
has to respond to the proposal xmi , he accepts with probability λp¯imi/ρmi > 0 and rejects
with probability q¯imi = 1−λp¯imi/ρmi < 1. This construction ensures that (4.42) holds. The
higher λ, the less delay before an outcome is accepted. The highest possible choice of λ
occurs when there is at least one player i for which q¯imi = 0. In that case, selection of player
i + 1 as proposer leads to a proposal that is accepted for sure. Note that λ = 0 would
violate p¯imi > 0. The set of CPEs is not closed. The no discounting case differs in this
respect from the discounting case where the set of equilibria is compact. This conforms to
Herings and Houba (2010) who report for a general class of bargaining models that the set
of CPEs may fail to be compact in the no discounting case.
By definition of this case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3. Since
also q¯imi < 1 and z¯
i = uimi, the conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy v¯
i
i ∈ (uimi , uibi),
i = 1, 2, 3. We conclude that there is an advantage in becoming the recognized player and
that a recognized player does strictly better than his security level uimi.
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Theorem 4.4.1 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, and z¯i ≥ uimi ,
i = 1, 2, 3, if and only if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. In this case, there is a unique CPE with
minimal delay. It is given by the solution (p¯, q¯) to (4.40), (4.41), and (4.42) with q¯ imi = 0
for at least one player i, where (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) is defined in (4.44)–(4.46). Other CPEs are
obtained by proportionally lowering 1 − q¯imi across players i. All CPEs induce the same
equilibrium utilities, given by z¯i = uimi, i = 1, 2, 3.
4.4.2 Case 2
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 (4.47)
q¯1 =


1
0
q¯12
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
q¯23

 , and q¯3 =


1
0
1
0

 , (4.48)
(1− q¯23)u33 + q¯23(p¯i1u31 + p¯i2u32 + p¯i3u33) ≥ u31, (4.49)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2,
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3,
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1,
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2(1− q¯12) : ρ3(1− q¯23). (4.50)
As in Subsection 4.3.1 we obtain that
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2, (4.51)
p¯i1 =
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
p¯i2 =
∆12∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
p¯i3 =
∆11∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
From (4.50) it then follows that
q¯12 = 1−
ρ1
ρ2
∆22
∆21
, (4.52)
q¯23 = 1−
ρ1
ρ3
∆11
∆12
. (4.53)
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To satisfy (4.49) we need that
ρ1
ρ3
≥ ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
2
(≤ ∆
1
2
∆11
). (4.54)
The requirements that q¯12 ≥ 0 and q¯23 ≥ 0 lead to
ρ1
ρ2
≤ ∆
2
1
∆22
, (4.55)
ρ3
ρ1
≥ ∆
1
1
∆12
. (4.56)
By definition of the case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u1m1 , z¯
2 = u2m2, and z¯
3 < u3m3 .
For i = 1, 2, qi−1bi < 1 and z¯
i = uimi imply that the conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy
v¯ii > u
i
mi
. Since z¯3 < u3m3 , it follows that player 3 has an advantage to propose.
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.2 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 ≥ u12,
z¯2 ≥ u23, and z¯3 < u31 if and only if ∆11∆21∆31 < ∆12∆22∆32 and ρ is such that (4.54), (4.55),
and (4.56) are satisfied. In this case, there is a unique CPE. It is given by (4.47), (4.48),
(4.52), and (4.53). The equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
For given utilities satisfying (4.51), (4.54) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently high compared
to ρ3, and (4.56) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently low. Moreover, ρ1 should be sufficiently low
compared to ρ2 by (4.55). Notice that, unlike the equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, the option
not to make a proposal cannot be chosen with any positive probability.
By (4.50), the equilibrium does not involve delay if and only if ρi is equal to p¯ii for ALL
i = 1, 2, 3.
By a relabeling of the players, we obtain fully symmetric results for equilibria with
p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯
1 ≥ u12, z¯2 < u23, and z¯3 ≥ u31, and for equilibria with p¯imi = 0,
i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 ≥ u23, and z¯3 ≥ u31.
4.4.3 Case 3
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 (4.57)
q¯1 =


1
0
q¯12
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
0

 , and q¯3 =


1
0
1
0

 , (4.58)
(1− q¯12)u22 + q¯12(p¯i1u21 + p¯i2u22 + p¯i3u23) ≥ u23, (4.59)
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p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (4.60)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 < u
2
3, (4.61)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (4.62)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2(1− q¯12) : ρ3. (4.63)
Rewriting (4.60) and using (4.63), we find that
ρ3 = ρ1
∆11
∆12
. (4.64)
It follows that Case 3 admits consistent subgame perfect equilibria in degenerate cases
only, more precisely, when (4.64) holds. In these degenerate cases, there is a continuum
of consistent subgame perfect equilibria, inducing a continuum of equilibrium utilities for
players 2 and 3. We parametrize the equilibria by means of the strictly positive real number
λ and using (4.63) we write
p¯i1 = λρ1,
p¯i3 = λρ1
∆11
∆12
.
Suppose by means of contradiction that λ < 1. Using (4.63), we find that
p¯i1 = λρ1 < ρ1,
p¯i2 =
p¯i1ρ2(1− q¯12)
ρ1
= λρ2(1− q¯12) < ρ2,
p¯i3 =
p¯i1ρ3
ρ1
= λρ3 < ρ3.
We obtain the contradiction 1 = p¯i1 + p¯i2 + pi3 < ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 = 1. Consequently, we have
shown that λ ≥ 1.
Since ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 = 1 and p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, we have
ρ2 = 1− ρ1 ∆
1
1 + ∆
1
2
∆12
,
p¯i2 = 1− λρ1 ∆
1
1 + ∆
1
2
∆12
.
Using (4.63), we have
q¯12 =
λ∆12 −∆12
λ∆12 − λρ1∆13
. (4.65)
The denominator of (4.65) is strictly positive if and only if ρ1 < ∆
1
2/∆
1
3. The inequalities
in (4.61) and (4.59) are satisfied if and only if
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
< λρ1 ≤ ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ρ1∆
1
2∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
(<
∆12
∆11 + ∆
1
2
). (4.66)
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The inequality in (4.66) in parentheses implies that q¯12 is strictly less than one, and that
p¯i2 is strictly positive.
The inequality (4.62) is satisfied if and only if
λρ1 <
∆12∆
3
2
∆11∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
3
2
. (4.67)
The first inequality of (4.66) together with (4.67) imply that
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2.
There is some λ ≥ 1 such that (4.66) and (4.67) are satisfied if and only if ∆11∆21∆31 <
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 and
ρ1 <
∆12∆
3
2
∆11∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
3
2
. (4.68)
The lowest possible value of λ ≥ 1 such that (4.66) and (4.67) are satisfied is given by
max{1, 1
ρ1
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
}. (4.69)
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.3 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 ≥ u12,
z¯2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31 if and only if ∆
1
1∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2, ρ3 = ρ1∆
1
1/∆
1
2, and ρ1 satisfies
(4.68). In this case there is a continuum of consistent subgame perfect equilibria. Any
λ ≥ 1 satisfying (4.66) and (4.67) induces a consistent subgame perfect equilibrium given
by (4.57), (4.58), and (4.65). Equilibrium utilities depend on λ and satisfy z¯1 = u12,
z¯2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
Notice that, unlike the equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, the option not to make a proposal
cannot be chosen with any positive probability. The equilibrium does not involve delay
if and only if λ = 1. Whenever ρ1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
1/(∆
1
1∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2), the lowest possible
choice for λ strictly exceeds 1, and delay cannot be avoided.
Fully symmetric results hold for equilibria with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯
1 < u12, z¯
2 ≥ u23,
and z¯3 < u31, and for equilibria with p¯
i
mi
= 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 < u23, and z¯
3 ≥ u31.
4.4.4 Case 4
It holds that (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q is a CPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =


0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 (4.70)
q¯1 =


1
0
0
1

 , q¯2 =


1
1
0
0

 , and q¯3 =


1
0
1
0

 , (4.71)
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p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 < u
1
2, (4.72)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 < u
2
3, (4.73)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (4.74)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2 : ρ3. (4.75)
The equalities in (4.75) immediately lead to the conclusion that p¯i1 = ρ1, p¯i2 = ρ2, and
p¯i3 = ρ3. The inequalities in (4.72)–(4.74) are equivalent to the following conditions:
ρ3
ρ1
>
∆11
∆12
, (4.76)
ρ1
ρ2
>
∆21
∆22
, (4.77)
ρ2
ρ3
>
∆31
∆32
. (4.78)
It is immediate to verify that (4.76)–(4.78) imply that ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2.
By definition of the case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 < u1m1, z¯
2 < u2m2 and z¯
3 <
u3m3 . Since each player accepts his middle alternative for sure, the conditional equilibrium
utilities satisfy v¯11 = u
1
1, v¯
2
2 = u
2
2 and v¯
3
3 = u
3
3. Therefore, each player has an advantage to
propose and, as the recognized player, each player can realize his best alternative for sure.
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.4 There is a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12,
z¯2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31 if and only if ∆
1
1∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2 and ρ is such that (4.76)–(4.78)
are satisfied. In this case there is a unique CPE. It is given by (4.70) and (4.71). The
equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
Notice that, unlike the equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, the option not to make a proposal
cannot be chosen with any positive probability. The equilibrium is in pure strategies
in which each player always proposes his best alternative and always accepts his best
and middle alternative. These strategies imply immediate agreement and the probability
distribution over the three alternatives coincides with the recognition probabilities, i.e.
p¯ii = ρi. The expected equilibrium utilities are below the utility of the middle alternative,
which makes accepting the middle alternative the unique best response. The recognized
player takes full advantage of this response by proposing his best alternative knowing it
will be accepted for sure.
4.5 Summary of Equilibrium Types
The results obtained thus far show that many different cases and subcases have to be
distinguished in characterizing all CPEs. It is astonishing that all except one of these
eight (sub)cases can occur in equilibrium, albeit that three subcases are degenerate. Also
by symmetry, permutations of the players’ roles adds to the multiplicity of cases. Four
subcases are robust in the sense of having positive Lebesgue measure in the parameter
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Theorem Proposals Utilities Occurrence
4.1 p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
4.3.1 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
4.3.2 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
4.4.1 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
4.4.2 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
4.4.3 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 Degenerate
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31 Degenerate
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
4.4.4 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
Table 2: Characteristics of the various types of equilibrium.
space. Only one of these four subcases admits a unique CPE in pure strategies. Table 2
summarizes these and other main characteristics of the equilibria as found in this section.
The robust cases have the following defining characteristics:
First, conditional on being recognized, at most one player randomizes between his best
and middle alternative, and the other players always propose their best alternative for sure.
To put it differently, at most one player proposes cautiously and the others aggressively.
Second, the number of players who get their best alternative accepted for sure can be
any number ranging from none to three.
Third, at the start of any bargaining round during ongoing negotiations, all players
can realize, in expectation, an equilibrium utility that is at most the utility of the middle
alternative. It also implies that each player i as a responding player faces a continuation
payoff after both responding players reject equal to z¯i ≤ uimi. In case the inequality is
strict, player i accepts for sure his middle alternative, whenever it is on the table. In
any CPE, this will provoke player i + 1 for whom mi is the best alternative to propose
aggressively whenever he is recognized.
Fourth, except for some degenerate cases, the recognized player does strictly better,
in expectation, than his security level that can be obtained for sure by proposing the
middle alternative. This implies that each recognized player has a strict advantage in being
recognized. Table 2 shows many cases in which the recognized player’s best alternative is
accepted for sure. It is also clear that the recognized player has an incentive to be aggressive
and proposes his best alternative with positive probability, often probability equal to one.
5 Special Cases and Examples
In this section, we discuss two special cases of interest to illustrate the type of results
obtained in the previous sections. These examples also serve as an illustration to the
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analyses that follow this section.
5.1 The Symmetric Case
Throughout this subsection, we will first consider a special case of interest in more detail,
namely what we call the symmetric case. In the symmetric case it holds that ρ1 = ρ2 =
ρ3 = 1/3, and for i = 1, 2, 3, the utilities u
i
bi
, uimi, and u
i
wi
are independent of i. Since in
this section we are considering the symmetric case, we drop the superscript i from ∆i1, ∆
i
2,
and ∆i3.
The condition of Theorem 4.1 then reduces to ∆1 = ∆2, or equivalently, for i = 1, 2, 3,
ui1 + u
i
3 = 2u
i
2, i.e. u
i
2 is the average of u
i
1 and u
i
3. From our expressions for p¯ij, we
find that p¯i1 = p¯i2 = p¯i3 = 1/3. In this case, there exists a CPE without any delay, as
well as CPEs with delay. In the CPE without delay, every player i proposes xmi with
probability 1, a proposal that is accepted for sure by player i + 1. The other CPEs are as
follows. All players i propose xmi with the same probability that is strictly in between 0
and 1, 0 < p¯1m1 = p¯
2
m2
= p¯3m3 < 1. Such a proposal is accepted for sure by player i + 1. The
remaining probability is put by player i on the option not to make a proposal x0 and the
proposal xbi , for i = 1, 2, 3, p¯
i
0 + p¯
i
bi
= 1 − p¯imi . Both proposals are identical in the sense
that they do not lead to the immediate acceptance of some outcome. Equilibrium utilities
satisfy z¯i = uimi, i = 1, 2, 3.
Equilibria as in Theorem 4.3.1 do not exist. By (4.21) and (4.23) we have that
1
2
<
(∆2)
3 − (∆1)3
(∆1)2∆2 + ∆1(∆2)2 + (∆2)3
≤ 1
3
,
a contradiction.
The conditions of Theorem 4.3.2 cannot hold. Indeed, from (4.38) it follows that
∆2 > ∆1, whereas (4.39) implies ∆2 < ∆1.
The condition of Theorem 4.4.1 reduces to ∆1 = ∆2, or equivalently, for i = 1, 2, 3,
ui1 +u
i
3 = 2u
i
2, i.e. u
i
2 is the average of u
i
1 and u
i
3. From our expressions for p¯ij, we find that
p¯i1 = pi2 = p¯i3 = 1/3. In this case, there exists a CPE without any delay, as well as CPEs
with delay. In the CPE without delay, every player i proposes xbi with probability 1, a
proposal that is accepted for sure by player i−1. The other CPEs are as follows. All players
i propose xbi with probability 1. Such a proposal is rejected by player i−1 with a probability
q¯i−1mi−1 that is independent of i and strictly in between 0 and 1, 0 < q¯
1
2 = q¯
2
3 = q¯
3
1 < 1. All
CPEs induce the same equilibrium utilities given by z¯i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3.
The conditions of Theorem 4.4.2 cannot hold. Indeed, since (∆1)
3 < (∆2)
3, we have
that ∆1 < ∆2. At the same time, (4.55) requires ∆2 ≤ ∆1, a contradiction.
The conditions of Theorem 4.4.3 do not hold since they require at the same time that
∆1 < ∆2 and ∆1 = ∆2.
The conditions of Theorem 4.4.4 hold if and only if ∆1 < ∆2. From our expressions
for pij, we find that p¯i1 = p¯i2 = p¯i3 = 1/3. The CPE does not involve delay. Every player
i proposes xbi with probability 1, a proposal that is accepted for sure by player i − 1. All
CPEs induce the same equilibrium utilities given by z¯i = (ui1 +u
i
2 +u
i
3)/3 < u
i
mi
, i = 1, 2, 3.
Summarizing, we have the following result.
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Theorem 5.1 For i = 1, 2, 3, let uibi, u
i
mi
, uiwi, and ρi be independent of i. There is
a CPE (p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q if and only if ∆1 ≤ ∆2. There is a CPE with the property that
p¯ibi = 1 and q¯
i
mi
= 0, i = 1, 2, 3. When ∆1 < ∆2 this is the unique CPE. When ∆1 = ∆2,
there are also equilibria (p¯, q¯) ∈ P ×Q with p¯ibi = 1 and q¯imi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, and equilibria
(p¯, q¯) ∈ P × Q with p¯imi > 0 and q¯imi = 1, i = 1, 2, 3. In the last type of equilibrium, some
players may actually use the option not to make a proposal with strictly positive probability
less than 1. Equilibrium utilities satisfy zi = (ui1 + u
i
2 + u
i
3)/3, i = 1, 2, 3 in all cases.
The equilibria in Theorem 5.1 are all symmetric in the sense that either all players
i propose xbi with equal probability, which is accepted with strictly positive probability
independent from i, or all players i propose xmi with equal probability, which is accepted
with strictly positive probability independent from i, whereas a proposal xbi is rejected for
sure. The latter situation may only occur in the degenerate case where ∆1 = ∆2. In this
degenerate case, there is a modest degree of asymmetry possible: some players may decide
not to make a proposal with probability strictly less than one, potentially dependent on
the identity of the player.
CPEs are unique when ∆1 < ∆2. They are essentially unique when ∆1 = ∆2 in the
sense that in the latter case all equilibria share the same realization probabilities pi1 = pi2 =
p¯i3 = 1/3 of the possible outcomes, and therefore share the same equilibrium utilities. It
follows that equilibrium utilities are given by zi = (ui1 + u
i
2 + u
i
3)/3, i = 1, 2, 3.
5.2 The Asymmetric Case: An Example
To study the asymmetric case, we consider the following example that allows for asymmetric
recognition probabilities in more detail. In this subsection we assume that
∆11 = ∆
2
1 = ∆
3
1 = 1,
∆12 = ∆
2
2 = ∆
3
2 = 2,
and an arbitrary ρ is taken. We normalize the utility of the worst alternative of a player
to 0.
Equilibria as in Theorem 4.1 and 4.4.1 do not exist.
The conditions of Theorem 4.3.1 and its symmetric analogues reduce to
ρ1 < ρ3 and ρ2 ≥ 12 ,
ρ2 < ρ1 and ρ3 ≥ 12 ,
ρ3 < ρ2 and ρ1 ≥ 12 .
The conditions of Theorem 4.3.2 and its symmetric analogues reduce to
2ρ1 < ρ2 and ρ2 <
1
2
,
2ρ2 < ρ3 and ρ3 <
1
2
,
2ρ3 < ρ1 and ρ1 <
1
2
.
The conditions of Theorem 4.4.2 and its symmetric analogues reduce to
ρ3 ≤ ρ1 ≤ 2ρ3 and 2ρ1 ≤ ρ2,
ρ1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 2ρ1 and 2ρ2 ≤ ρ3,
ρ2 ≤ ρ3 ≤ 2ρ2 and 2ρ3 ≤ ρ1.
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The conditions of Theorem 4.4.3 and its symmetric analogues reduce to
ρ1 <
4
7
and 2ρ3 = ρ1,
ρ2 <
4
7
and 2ρ1 = ρ2,
ρ3 <
4
7
and 2ρ2 = ρ3.
The conditions of Theorem 4.4.4 and its symmetric analogues reduce to
ρ1 < 2ρ3,
ρ2 < 2ρ1,
ρ3 < 2ρ2.
We illustrate the above in the following figure. The areas corresponding to Theo-
4.4.4
4.4.3
4.4.3
4.4.3
4.4.2
4.4.2
4.4.2
4.3.2
4.3.2
4.3.2
4.3.1
4.3.1
4.3.1


1
0
0




0
1
0




0
0
1


Figure 1: Conditions on ρ for which particular types of equilibria exist.
rem 4.3.2 and 4.4.4 are open, and the areas corresponding to Theorem 4.4.2 are closed.
The areas corresponding to Theorem 4.3.1 are closed when adjacent to the area of The-
orem 4.3.2 and open when adjacent to Theorem 4.4.2. The area corresponding to Theo-
rem 4.4.3 is drawn by thick lines. The theorems almost partition the unit simplex, with
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the exception of the intersection of the areas corresponding to Theorem 4.4.2 and 4.4.3,
where different types of equilibria overlap.
The next figure indicates the utility level of player 1 per area. Player 1’s equilib-
rium utility is not monotonic in his recognition probability. The intuition is that next
to player 1’s own recognition probability, the recognition probability of player 3 matters.
When player 3 has a high recognition probability, then he will frequently propose the third
outcome, which is the worst case scenario from the perspective of player 1. The correspon-
dence associating to each ρ the set of possible equilibrium utility levels of player 1 is upper
hemi-continuous, but not continuous. It is multiple valued in the area corresponding to
Theorem 4.4.3.
2
2ρ1 + 2ρ2 3ρ1 + 2ρ2
1 + 2ρ2
1


1
0
0




0
1
0




0
0
1


Figure 2: Equilibrium utility of player 1 in relation to ρ.
The next figure depicts the probability of delay. Notice that if this probability is equal to
α, then the expected delay is α/(1−α) periods. Delay varies in an upper hemi-continuous
way with recognition probabilities ρ. The probability of delay is zero when recognition
probabilities are all close to 1/3. When one or two recognition probabilities converge to
zero, then the probability of delay converges to one, so the expected delay converges to
infinity.
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Figure 3: The probability of delay in relation to ρ. For region 4.4.3 it holds that λ1 ∈
( 2
7ρ1
, 4
7ρ1
)∩[1, 2+4ρ1
7ρ1
], λ2 ∈ ( 27ρ2 , 47ρ2 )∩[1,
2+4ρ2
7ρ2
], and λ3 ∈ ( 27−7ρ1−7ρ2 , 47−7ρ1−7ρ2 )∩[1,
6−4ρ1−4ρ2
7−7ρ1−7ρ2
].
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6 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria
The results of Section 4 establish that equilibria can only exist if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 ≤ ∆12∆22∆32. In
this section we show that this condition is not only necessary, but also sufficient for the
existence of equilibria. Both Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.4.1 imply that equilibria exist
for all values of the recognition probabilities ρ when ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. Therefore we
only have to examine whether equilibria exist when ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2, irrespective of
the values of the recognition probabilities ρ.
It is instructive to define the risk coefficient αi of player i by
αi =
∆i1
∆i2
, i = 1, 2, 3.
The risk coefficient is closely related to the concept of risk limit as introduced in Zeuthen
(1930) and further developed in Harsanyi (1977). The risk limit is defined in a setting with
two players and three outcomes. There is the outcome proposed by the player himself,
say y1, the outcome proposed by his opponent, say y2, and the disagreement outcome,
say y0. The risk limit of a player is then defined as the probability on the disagreement
outcome for which he would be indifferent between getting the disagreement outcome with
this probability and y1 with the remaining probability, and getting outcome y2 for sure. In
a formula the risk limit ` is given by
` =
u(y1)− u(y2)
u(y1)− u(y0) .
This paper involves three players and four alternatives (we now count the disagreement
outcome as one alternative), so the risk limit is not directly applicable. However, if we
define y1 as the best alternative xbi for player i, y2 as his middle alternative xmi , and y0 as
his worst alternative xwi , then a straightforward calculation reveals that
`i =
∆i1
∆i1 + ∆
i
2
=
αi
1 + αi
.
Alternatively, we can write αi = `i/(1− `i).
The condition ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 ≤ ∆12∆22∆32 can be rewritten as α1α2α3 ≤ 1, or as 3
√
α1α2α3 ≤ 1.
In words this condition expresses that the geometric mean of the players’ risk coefficients
is less than or equal to 1.
To simplify the analysis, we introduce some additional notation, in particular the coef-
ficients βi, defined by
β1 =
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
2∆
3
2
,
β2 =
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
1∆
2
1∆
3
2 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
2
,
β3 =
∆12∆
2
2∆
3
2 −∆11∆21∆31
∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1∆
3
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
1
.
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Theorem Conditions Implications
4.3.1 ρ1
ρ3
< β1 ρ2 ≥ α3β3 ρ1ρ2 < α2
ρ2
ρ1
> β2 ρ1 < α2β2
ρ3
ρ2
< β3 ρ1 ≥ α2β2 ρ3ρ1 < α1
ρ1
ρ3
> β1 ρ3 < α1β1
ρ2
ρ1
< β2 ρ3 ≥ α1β1 ρ2ρ3 < α3
ρ3
ρ2
> β3 ρ2 < α3β3
4.3.2 ρ1
ρ2
< α2 ρ2 < α3β3
ρ3
ρ1
> α1
ρ1
ρ3
< β1
ρ3
ρ1
< α1 ρ1 < α2β2
ρ2
ρ3
> α3
ρ3
ρ2
< β3
ρ2
ρ3
< α3 ρ3 < α1β1
ρ1
ρ2
> α2
ρ2
ρ1
< β2
4.4.2 ρ1
ρ3
≥ β1 ρ1ρ2 ≤ α2
ρ3
ρ1
≥ α1
ρ3
ρ2
≥ β3 ρ3ρ1 ≤ α1
ρ2
ρ3
≥ α3
ρ2
ρ1
≥ β2 ρ2ρ3 ≤ α3
ρ1
ρ2
≥ α2
4.4.3 ρ3
ρ1
= α1 ρ1 <
1
1+α1+α1α3
ρ1
ρ2
= α2 ρ2 <
1
1+α2+α1α2
ρ2
ρ3
= α3 ρ3 <
1
1+α3+α2α3
4.4.4 ρ1
ρ2
> α2
ρ2
ρ3
> α3
ρ3
ρ1
> α1
Table 3: Equilibrium types and conditions on recognition probabilities.
In the definition of βi it holds that ∆
i
1 enters in each term in the denominator. To manip-
ulate the conditions as expressed in αi and βi, it is useful to note that
β1
1+β1
= α2β2,
β2
1+β2
= α3β3,
β3
1+β3
= α1β1,
β1 =
1−α1α2α3
α1α2α3+α1α3+α1
,
β2 =
1−α1α2α3
α1α2α3+α1α2+α2
,
β3 =
1−α1α2α3
α1α2α3+α2α3+α3
.
The conditions on recognition probabilities identified in Section 4 under which equilibria of
a particular type exist are summarized in Table 3. Subtypes are ordered in the same way
as in Table 2. For all equilibrium types listed in Table 3 it holds that ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2,
or equivalently, α1α2α3 < 1. Table 3 also shows that the conditions for which particular
types of equilibria exist can be formulated in terms of the players’ risk coefficients (since
also βi can be expressed in terms of α1, α2, and α3) and recognition probability vector ρ
only.
The last column of Table 3 states some of the implications that follow from the condi-
tions on the parameters. We show next how these implications can be derived.
Consider the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.3.1 and suppose by way of contradic-
tion that ρ1/ρ2 ≥ α2. Then
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 > α2α3β3 + α3β3 +
α2α3β3
β1
= 1,
a contradiction, so consequently ρ1/ρ2 < α2. Similarly, the supposition ρ2/ρ1 ≤ β2 implies
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 >
α3β3
β2
+ α3β3 +
α3β3
β1β2
= 1 +
α3β3
β1β2
> 1,
a contradiction, so consequently ρ2/ρ1 > β2. Also, the supposition ρ1 ≥ α2β2 implies
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 > α2β2 + α3β3 +
α2β2
β1
= 1 + α3β3 > 1,
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a contradiction, so consequently ρ1 < α2β2. The other implications of Theorem 4.3.1 follow
by symmetry.
Consider the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.3.2 and suppose by way of contradic-
tion ρ3/ρ1 ≤ α1. Then we obtain
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 < α2α3β3 + α3β3 + α1α2α3β3 = (1− α1α2α3) < 1,
a contradiction, so consequently ρ3/ρ1 > α1. Similarly, the supposition ρ1/ρ3 ≥ β1 implies
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 < α2α3β3 + α3β3 +
α2α3β3
β1
= 1,
a contradiction, so consequently ρ1/ρ3 < β1. The other implications of Theorem 4.3.2 fol-
low by symmetry.
Theorem 6.1 There exists a CPE if and only if the geometric mean of the players’
risk coefficients is less than or equal to 1.
Proof: All results in Section 4 impose the condition ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 ≤ ∆12∆22∆32 for equilib-
rium existence. By Theorem 4.1 an equilibrium exists if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. It remains
to be shown that an equilibrium exists if ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2.
By Theorem 4.4.4 an equilibrium exists if ρ1/ρ2 > α2, ρ2/ρ3 > α3, and ρ3/ρ1 > α1.
Consider now the cases where the conditions of Theorem 4.4.4 are not satisfied. We claim
that then
(
ρ3
ρ1
≥ α1 and ρ1
ρ2
≤ α2) or (ρ1
ρ2
≥ α2 and ρ2
ρ3
≤ α3) or (ρ2
ρ3
≥ α3 and ρ3
ρ1
≤ α1). (6.1)
Indeed, assume, without loss of generality, ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2. Either it holds that ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 or
ρ3/ρ1 < α1. In the former case the first formula in (6.1) is true, in the latter case it should
hold that ρ2/ρ3 ≥ α3, since otherwise
1 =
ρ1
ρ2
ρ2
ρ3
ρ3
ρ1
< α2α3α1 < 1,
and the third formula in (6.1) is true.
We show next that an equilibrium exists whenever ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 and ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2. The
other two cases in (6.1) follow by symmetry. If ρ3/ρ1 = α1 and ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2, then line 1
in Theorem 4.4.3 implies the existence of an equilibrium since ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2 implies ρ1 <
1/(1 + α1 + α1α3). Suppose, by contradiction, that ρ1 ≥ 1/(1 + α1 + α1α3). Then
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 ≥ 1
1 + α1 + α1α3
+
1
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
+
α1
1 + α1 + α1α3
=
1 + α2 + α1α2
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
> 1,
a contradiction. If ρ1/ρ2 = α2 and ρ3/ρ1 > α1, then line 2 in Theorem 4.4.3 implies the
existence of an equilibrium since ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 implies ρ2 < 1/(1 + α2 + α1α2). Suppose, by
contradiction, that ρ2 ≥ 1/(1 + α2 + α1α2). Then
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 >
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
+
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
+
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
= 1,
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a contradiction.
It remains to be shown that an equilibrium exists if ρ3/ρ1 > α1 and ρ1/ρ2 < α2. By
line 1 in Theorem 4.4.2, an equilibrium exists if ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1, ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2, and ρ1/ρ3 ≥ β1,
and by line 1 in Theorem 4.3.1 an equilibrium exists if ρ1/ρ3 < β1 and ρ2 ≥ α3β3.
It remains to be shown that an equilibrium exists if ρ3/ρ1 > α1, ρ1/ρ2 < α2, ρ1/ρ3 < β1,
and ρ2 < α3β3. This follows from line 1 in Theorem 4.3.2. Q.E.D.
The necessary and sufficient condition for existence allows for one or two risk coefficients
that are larger than one, but then at least one player’s risk coefficient should be sufficiently
below one. A risk coefficient bounded by one has a nice economic interpretation, related
to the following definition.
Definition 6.2 The utility function ui is compromise-prone if
ui(xmi) ≥
1
2
ui(xbi) +
1
2
ui(xwi).
A utility function is said to be compromise-prone if the utility of the middle alternative
is at least as high as getting the best alternative with probability one half and getting the
worst alternative with probability one half. This condition has in our discrete setting the
same interpretation as risk-aversion (concavity) for an environment with a continuum of
alternatives. The opposite, a lack of compromise proneness, implies risk-seeking (convex-
ity). A player i has a compromise-prone utility function if and only if αi ≤ 1. The following
corollary now follows immediately.
Corollary 6.3 If all players have compromise-prone utility functions, then there ex-
ists a CPE.
From Table 3, it immediately follows that the existence of pure CPEs with immediate
agreement for symmetric bargaining protocols, i.e. ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 =
1
3
, is equivalent to hav-
ing three compromise-prone players. So, for symmetric bargaining protocols, compromise-
prone players are necessary and sufficient for existence of a pure CPE with immediate
agreement in which recognized players propose their best alternative for sure and each
player accepts his best and middle alternative for sure.
In general, existence of CPEs requires that at least some player should be sufficiently
compromise-prone to compensate for the possible lack of such proneness of the other play-
ers. Compromise-prone players have an incentive to seek agreement.
The examples in Section 5 show that equilibrium may not be unique and that there
might be infinitely many equilibrium utilities. The following result demonstrates that such
examples are degenerate in the sense that this set of games has a closure with Lebesgue
measure zero. To compute the Lebesgue measure of a set of games, we consider a game
(u, ρ) as a subset of R9 × R2, i.e. identifying ρ by its first two coordinates. To require the
zero Lebesgue measure property for the closure of a set of games, evidently implies this
property for the set of games itself, but not vice versa, as for instance illustrated by the
set of rational numbers.
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Theorem Delay probability Occurrence
4.1 [1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ρ1, ρ2α1α2 ,
ρ3
α2
}, 1) Degenerate
4.3.1 ρ2 + (α1α2α3(1 + β2)− β2)(1− ρ2)
ρ1 + (α1α2α3(1 + β1)− β1)(1− ρ1)
ρ3 + (α1α2α3(1 + β3)− β3)(1− ρ3)
4.3.2 α3−(1+α2)α3ρ2
α3+ρ2
α2−(1+α1)α2ρ1
α2+ρ1
α1−(1+α3)α1ρ3
α1+ρ3
4.4.1 1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ ρ1α2 , ρ2,
ρ3
α1α2
} Degenerate
4.4.2 1− 1+α2+α1α2
α2
ρ1
1− 1+α1+α1α3
α1
ρ3
1− 1+α3+α2α3
α3
ρ2
4.4.3 D1 Degenerate
D2 Degenerate
D3 Degenerate
4.4.4 0
D1 = [max{0, 1− 1+α2+α1α2ρ1α2 }, 1− 1+α2+α1α2α2+ρ1 ρ1] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α2+α1α2ρ1
α2
}, 1− (1 + α1 + α1α3)ρ1)
D2 = [max{0, 1− 1+α3+α2α3ρ2α3 }, 1− 1+α3+α2α3α3+ρ2 ρ2] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α3+α2α3ρ2
α3
}, 1− (1 + α2 + α1α2)ρ2)
D3 = [max{0, 1− 1+α1+α1α3ρ3α1 }, 1− 1+α1+α1α3α1+ρ3 ρ3] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α1+α1α3ρ3
α1
}, 1− (1 + α3 + α2α3)ρ3)
Table 4: Delay probabilities.
Theorem 6.4 Consider the set of games (u, ρ) ∈ G where the geometric mean of the
players’ risk coefficients is less than or equal to 1. Except for a subset of games whose
closure has Lebesgue measure zero, there is a unique CPE.
Proof: Existence follows from Theorem 6.1. Leave out the games satisfying the
conditions of Theorem 4.3.1, Theorem 4.1, and Theorem 4.4.1. This corresponds to a set
of games whose closure has Lebesgue measure zero. Comparing the conditions in any two
distinct rows (that do not correspond to Theorem 4.3.1) of Table 3 leads to the conclusion
that the corresponding two sets of parameters have an empty intersection. This conclusion
follows directly in most cases. In some cases one has to make use of the property that
αiβi < 1, which implies that we cannot have simultaneously ρj/ρk < αi and ρk/ρj < βi.
7 Delay and Cycles
We analyze the extent to which there can be delay in the CPE. If the probability that there
is delay is α, then the expected delay is equal to α/(1− α) periods. Using the results of
Section 4, it is a straightforward exercise to compute the probability of delay. Table 4 gives
an overview of the delay probabilities. In some cases the delay probability is given by an
interval. This means that for every value of delay in the interval, there is an equilibrium
with that probability of delay.
An important question is whether there always exist some ρ that implies existence of a
CPE without delay.
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Theorem 7.1 Let u be such that the geometric mean of the players’ risk coefficients is
less than or equal to one. Then there is a ρ such that (u, ρ) has a CPE without delay.
Proof: First we consider the case where ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 = ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2. From Table 4 and
Theorem 4.1 it follows that we can choose
ρ1 =
∆12∆
2
2
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
ρ2 =
∆11∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
,
ρ3 =
∆12∆
2
1
∆11∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
1 + ∆
1
2∆
2
2
.
Next we consider the case where ∆11∆
2
1∆
3
1 < ∆
1
2∆
2
2∆
3
2, i.e. 3
√
α1α2α3 < 1 We show that ρ
can be chosen such that the conditions of Theorem 4.4.4 as listed in Table 3 are satisfied.
We define γ = 1/ 3
√
α1α2α3 > 1 and
ρ1 =
γ2α2α3
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
ρ2 =
γα3
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
ρ3 =
1
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
.
It therefore holds that
ρ1
ρ2
= γα2 > α2,
ρ2
ρ3
= γα3 > α3,
ρ3
ρ1
= 1
γ2α2α3
= γα1 > α1.
Q.E.D.
If we think of the parameters ρi as a measure of bargaining power, then Theorem 7.1
makes clear that irrespective of the players’ utility functions, delay in bargaining can be
avoided under an appropriate distribution of bargaining power. This theorem extends
the no-delay result reported earlier for symmetric procedures under three players with
compomise-prone utility functions to arbitrary utility functions.
The next result shows that the expected delay in bargaining goes to infinity when one
player has all the bargaining power.
Theorem 7.2 Let u be such that the geometric mean of the players’ risk coefficients
is less than or equal to one. Consider a sequence of recognition probability vectors (ρn)n∈N
which converges to ei, the i-th unit vector, for some i = 1, 2, 3. For n ∈ N, let (pn, qn) be a
CPE of (u, ρn) and denote the corresponding delay probability by δn. Then limn→∞ δn = 1.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may assume that for all n ∈ N, (u, ρn) satisfies
the conditions of exactly one of the theorems, i.e. one of the 15 cases displayed in Table 4.
According to Table 4, the lower bound on the delay probability following from an
equilibrium of Theorem 4.1 is given by
1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ρn1 ,
ρn2
α1α2
,
ρn3
α2
}.
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Clearly, this lower bound converges to 1 when n →∞.
According to Table 3, the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.3.1 states that ρn2 ≥ α3β3,
so limn→∞ ρ
n
2 = 1. Then Table 4, first line corresponding to 4.3.1, yields that limn→∞ δn = 1.
The other cases corresponding to Theorem 4.3.1 follow by symmetry.
According to Table 3, the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.3.2 states that ρn2 <
α3β3, so it is impossible that limn→∞ ρ
n
2 = 1, so limn→∞ ρ
n
2 = 0. Then Table 4, first
line corresponding to 4.3.2, yields that limn→∞ δn = 1. The other cases corresponding to
Theorem 4.3.2 follow by symmetry.
It is evident from Table 4 that the delay probability following from Theorem 4.4.1 goes
to 1 when n goes to infinity.
According to Table 3, the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.4.2 states that ρn1 ≤ α2ρn2 ,
so limn→∞ ρ
n
1 = 0. Then Table 4, first line corresponding to 4.4.2, yields that limn→∞ δn = 1.
The other cases corresponding to Theorem 4.4.2 follow by symmetry.
According to Table 3, the first line of conditions in Theorem 4.4.3 states that ρn1 <
1/(1+α1 +α1α3), so limn→∞ ρ
n
1 = 0. Then Table 4, first line corresponding to 4.4.3, yields
that the lower bound on the delay probability following from an equilibrium converges to
1. The other cases corresponding to Theorem 4.4.3 follow by symmetry.
Table 3 demonstrates that (u, ρn)n∈N cannot satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.4.4.
Suppose without loss of generality that limn→∞ ρ
n
1 = 0. Since ρ
n
2 < ρ
n
1/α2, we have
limn→∞ ρ
n
2 = 0. Since ρ
n
3 < ρ
n
2/α3, we have limn→∞ ρ
n
3 = 0. It follows that ρ converges
to the zero vector, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We also analyze whether cycles can occur. Cycles should occur according to the Con-
dorcet logic. Other authors like Chwe (1994) have argued using tools from cooperative
game theory that cycles should not occur when players are farsighted. We say that a par-
ticular play of the game has resulted in a cycle if all three alternatives have been proposed
and rejected, before some alternative is accepted. An equilibrium is said to have a cycle
if there is a positive probability that the equilibrium path has resulted in a cycle. If an
equilibrium has a cycle, then clearly there is also a positive probability on an equilibrium
path where consecutively alternatives 1, 2, 3, and 1 are proposed and rejected.
Theorem 7.3 The set of games (u, ρ) ∈ G admitting CPEs with cycles has Lebesgue
measure zero.
Proof: It is easily verified that, with the exception of Theorem 4.1 and 4.4.3, there
is always an alternative that, in equilibrium, is never rejected when being proposed. The
Conditions in Theorem 4.1 and 4.3 are only satisfied for sets of games having a closure
with Lebesgue measure zero. Q.E.D.
Cycles occur with positive probability in the CPEs of Theorem 4.1 and 4.4.3. It is easily
verified that for Theorem 4.1 there is always a CPE where the equilibrium path results in
a cycle with probability arbitrarily close to one. But the conditions of these theorems hold
in degenerate cases only.
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8 The Role of Risk Aversion
In this section we investigate the role of risk aversion. We concentrate on the impact of
risk aversion on the equilibrium outcome probability vector (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) . Player 1 is at least
as good off with the lottery (p¯i′1, p¯i
′
2, p¯i
′
3) instead of (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) when p¯i
′
1 ≥ pi1, p¯i′2 ≥ p¯i2, and
p¯i′3 ≤ p¯i3.
The standard approach to risk aversion in bargaining is to take a concave transformation
of one of the player’s utility functions. Taking such a transformation for player i will reduce
his risk coefficient, because the gap between uimi and u
i
wi
will become relatively larger
than the gap between uibi and u
i
mi
. The equilibrium probability vector (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) can be
rewritten in terms of risk coefficients only and for that reason we perform the comparative
statics with respect to changes in risk aversion as changes in the player’s risk coefficients.
Table 5 reports the equilibrium outcome probability vectors. For Theorem 4.4.3, first
line, λ ≥ 1 should be chosen to satisfy (4.66) and (4.67). For the other two lines cor-
responding to Theorem 4.4.3, λ ≥ 1 should satisfy the appropriate analogues of (4.66)
and (4.67). We evaluate the local effects of a change in a player’s risk coefficient for the
non-degenerate cases.
Theorem Utilities p¯i1 p¯i2 p¯i3 Occurrence
4.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
Degenerate
4.3.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1
1+α1+α1α3
α1α3
1+α1+α1α3
α1
1+α1+α1α3
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2α3
1+α3+α2α3
α3
1+α3+α2α3
1
1+α3+α2α3
4.3.2 z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2(α3+ρ2)
1+α3+α2α3
α3+ρ2
1+α3+α2α3
1−ρ2(1+α2)
1+α3+α2α3
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2+ρ1
1+α2+α1α2
1−ρ1(1+α1)
1+α2+α1α2
α1(α2+ρ1)
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1−ρ3(1+α3)
1+α1+α1α3
α3(α1+ρ3)
1+α1+α1α3
α1+ρ3
1+α1+α1α3
4.4.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
Degenerate
4.4.2 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1
1+α1+α1α3
α1α3
1+α1+α1α3
α1
1+α1+α1α3
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2α3
1+α3+α2α3
α3
1+α3+α2α3
1
1+α3+α2α3
4.4.3 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 λρ1 1− λρ1 (1 + α1) α1λρ1 Degenerate
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31 α2λρ2 λρ2 1− λρ2 (1 + α2) Degenerate
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31 1− λρ3 (1 + α3) α3λρ3 λρ3 Degenerate
4.4.4 z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
Table 5: CPE outcome probabilities.
Consider the first line of Theorem 4.3.1 and 4.4.2 for which
(p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
).
We have that
∂p¯i1
∂α1
< 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α1
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α1
> 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α2
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α2
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α2
> 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α3
= 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α3
= 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α3
= 0,
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and ∂p¯i1
∂αi
+ ∂p¯i2
∂αi
+ ∂p¯i3
∂αi
= 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
An increase in α1 yields player 1 lower probabilities for obtaining his best and middle
alternatives and an increased probability for obtaining his worst alternative. So, a less
risk averse type of player 1 is unambiguously worse off. The next question is whether
one or both other players benefit from such a change. This issue is straightforward for
player 3, who would face an increased probability for obtaining his best alternative and
lower probabilities for obtaining his middle and worst alternatives. Therefore, player 3
is unambiguously better off if player 1 becomes less risk averse. Player 2 faces lower
probabilities for both his best and worst alternatives and an increased probability for his
middle alternative. Notice however that player 2 obtains an equilibrium utility of z¯2 = u23,
which is not affected by the risk coefficient of player 1.
Next, an increase in α2 yields player 2 a lower probability for obtaining his best alter-
native and increased probabilities for attaining his middle and worst alternatives. A less
risk averse type of player 2 is unambiguously worse off, albeit that player 2 is affected in a
different manner than player 1 is affected by changes in α1. Since player 3 faces increased
probabilities for obtaining his best and middle alternatives and a lower probability for ob-
taining his worst alternative, player 3 is unambiguously better off if player 2 becomes less
risk averse. The equilibrium utility for player 1 is not affected by the risk coefficient of
player 3.
Finally, changes in player 3’s risk coefficient have no effect on the outcome probability
vector, so both situations are unambiguously equivalent for all the players.
The second and third line corresponding to Theorem 4.3.1 and 4.4.2 are obtained by a
permutation of the players and lead to analogous results.
Consider the first line corresponding to Theorem 4.3.2 for which
(p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (
α2 (α3 + ρ2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
,
α3 + ρ2
1 + α3 + α2α3
,
1− ρ2 (1 + α2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
).
We have that
∂p¯i1
∂α1
= 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α1
= 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α1
= 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α2
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α2
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α2
< 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α3
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α3
> 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α3
< 0,
and ∂p¯i1
∂α1
+ ∂p¯i2
∂α1
+ ∂p¯i3
∂α1
= 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. For this derivation, observe that
∂
∂α3
α2 (α3 + ρ2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
=
α2 (1− ρ2 (1 + α2))
(1 + α3 + α2α3)
2 =
α2
1 + α3 + α2α3
p¯i3 > 0.
First, changes in player 1’s risk coefficient have no effect. Second, in case player 2 becomes
less risk averse then this player is always worse off and player 1 is always better off. The
marginal effect of a change in α2 on the equilibrium utility of player 3 is given by
∂pi1
∂α2
u31 +
∂pi2
∂α2
u32 +
∂pi3
∂α3
u33 =
(α3+ρ2)(1+α3)
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u31 − (α3+ρ2)α3(1+α3+α2α3)2 u32 −
α3+ρ2
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u33
= (α3+ρ2)α3
(1+α3+α2α3)2
∆32 − α3+ρ2(1+α3+α2α3)2 ∆31 = 0.
Third, in case player 3 becomes less risk averse then this player is always worse off and
player 1 is always better off. The marginal effect of a change in α3 on the equilibrium
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utility of player 2 is given by
∂pi1
∂α3
u21 +
∂pi2
∂α3
u22 +
∂pi3
∂α3
u23 =
α2(1−ρ2(1+α2))
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u21 +
(1−ρ2(1+α2))
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u22 − (1−ρ2(1+α2))(1+α2)(1+α3+α2α3)2 u23
= −α2(1−ρ2(1+α2))
(1+α3+α2α3)2
∆22 +
1−ρ2(1+α2)
(1+α3+α2α3)2
∆21 = 0.
The second and third line corresponding to Theorem 4.3.2 are obtained by a permutation
of the players and lead to analogous results.
Consider Theorem 4.4.4 for which (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3). Then,
∂p¯ii
∂αj
= 0 for all
i, j = 1, 2, 3. This implies that changes in any player’s risk aversion have no effect on the
outcome probability vector and for each player the situation before and after such a change
is unambiguously equivalent.
In summary, we obtain effects that are opposite to the well-known effects from two
player alternating-offers bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution, see e.g. Roth (1985),
Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha (1990), and Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1991). In these
references, less risk aversion leads to a better bargaining result. Here, for the three cases
of Theorem 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.4.2, we obtain that the opposite effect that less risk aversion
leads to a worse outcome in the sense that the probability of attaining the best alternative
decreases while the probabilities for obtaining the middle and worst alternative increase.
In the remaining main case, the one of Theorem 4.4.4, changes in risk attitudes have no
effect. So, combining these four cases, we find opposite effects for risk aversion on the
own bargaining position. Due to Pareto efficiency of every CPE, at least one player has to
benefit. We find for the main cases that at least one player is unaffected by a change in
one of the risk coefficients.
9 Concluding Remarks
We model decision making by three players over a set consisting of three alternatives as
a bargaining game in extensive form. The set-up corresponds to the well-known Con-
dorcet paradox in the sense that the players’ utility functions are such that naive majority
voting over the alternatives results in a Condorcet cycle. We consider the case of sophis-
ticated players and formulate a strategic bargaining model to study the proposals and
acceptance/rejection decisions as made by rational players.
The paper analyzes the consistent subgame perfect equilibria of the game. It is shown
that such equilibria exist if and only if the geometric mean of the players’ risk coefficients
is less than or equal to 1. A sufficient condition for equilibrium existence is that players be
compromise-prone, i.e. the utility of the middle alternative is at least as high as the utility
of getting the best alternative with probability one half and getting the worst alternative
with probability one half. These conditions also admit an interpretation in terms of the
risk limit of Zeuthen (1930) and Harsanyi (1977).
When the geometric mean of the players’ risk coefficients is less than or equal to 1,
equilibria do not only exist, but are also typically unique. A player never proposes his
worst alternative and knows that his middle alternative, when proposed, will be accepted
for sure by the player for whom this is the best alternative. The trade-off for a proposer is
therefore to propose either his best alternative, which might be rejected, or to propose his
middle alternative which is accepted for sure. A player that has to respond to a proposal
accepts his best alternative and rejects his worst alternative. He faces a trade-off when
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his middle alternative is offered to him. Accepting this alternative leads to utility equal
to the middle alternative for sure, rejecting it leads to a particular probability distribution
over the three alternatives. The situation where an agreement is never reached cannot be
supported as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Many equilibria feature delay before an agreement is reached. We show that for any
specification of the players’ risk coefficients, there are recognition probability vectors for
which no delay occurs before an agreement is reached, but also that expected delay goes to
infinity when recognition probability vectors converge to a unit vector, i.e. in the limit a
single player is the only proposer. Contrary to the usual intuition, decreasing risk aversion
weakens the bargaining position of a player.
In this paper, we study the case without discounting. The question how the situation
with little discounting is related to the case without discounting is studied in the companion
paper Herings and Houba (2010). In this reference, also natural extensions of the model
with more than three alternatives and more than three players are dealt with. Though the
calculations of the three alternative-three player case are quite demanding, the end results
are sufficiently neat to sustain some hope that progress on the general case with Condorcet
cycles is within reach.
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